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Executive Summary and Recommendations 
 
Following his lecture at the Kuwait Foundation for the Advancement of Sciences–London School of 
Economics (KFAS–LSE) biannual seminar in March 2009, KFAS invited Mr Will Hutton to lead a 
joint LSE–Work Foundation team – supported by a Local Team of Experts (LTE) from KFAS, the 
Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research (KISR) and Kuwait University (KU) – to investigate how The 
Work Foundation framework for knowledge-economy development might work in a Kuwaiti context. 
The plan was to write an initial scoping report and then, if agreement was reached on its analysis 
and principal recommendations, to proceed to a much more detailed and granular investigation 
with practical and well-thought-through proposals for implementation. 
 
The focal point for the work was a four-day visit to Kuwait in March 2010 in which Mr Hutton 
presented his initial thoughts and framework to a specially invited group at KFAS. In addition he 
and his team had an intense programme of interviews with key representatives from those public 
and private sector organisations likely to be important in developing Kuwait’s knowledge economy. 
He and his team have kept in close touch with the LTE throughout the process, including the 
drafting of this scoping report, and very much welcome and appreciate the energy and feedback 
from the Kuwaiti side. There has been a growing consensus that the analysis and 
recommendations offer a very promising avenue for Kuwait to explore, building on both the Four 
Year Development Plan and the Blair Report. There is an opportunity to be seized.  
 
Introduction  
 
The genesis for this scoping report on Kuwait’s strategic options for developing a more knowledge-
based economy was a conference in Kuwait held by KFAS and the LSE in March 2009. Among the 
varying contributions, the LSE’s Mr Will Hutton (also executive vice-chair of The Work Foundation) 
gave a lecture arguing that the development of the knowledge economy was the central economic 
feature of not only developed but developing economies. Employment over the last few decades 
had shifted increasingly to high-value-added goods and services, now typically occupying 45 per 
cent of advanced economies’ GDP and rising. This is because of the interaction of the exponential 
growth of both transformatory and incremental technologies with ever more demanding and 
sophisticated consumers.  
 
Innovation has thus become increasingly important as a driver of growth, along with rising 
investment in “intangible” assets with a knowledge character, like research and development 
(R&D), design, and information and communication technologies (ICTs). Workplaces require 
engaged and up-skilled workers. As a result of these deep trends the boundaries between 
traditional manufacturing activity and services are breaking down, and a new “manu-service“ sector 
is emerging in which manufacturing and service functions are being fused. Manufacturers are 
anxious to preserve market leadership by embedding service capabilities as part of the customer 
offer in industries as disparate as aero-engines, automobiles and mobile phones. Sixty per cent of 
US manufacturing firms are now categorised as manu-service companies; interestingly, the figure 
in China is 1 per cent. This is propelling investment in intangibles across a broad front – not just in 
design and R&D, but in brand equity, leadership and organisational development. Intangible 
investment now typically exceeds 9 per cent of GDP in most advanced economies, and exceeds 
tangible investment in plant and machinery. The lecture and follow-up discussions opened a 
discussion of the potential relevance of these phenomena for a country like Kuwait, ambitious to 
break out of the distortions of natural resource-based growth and transition to a knowledge-based 
economy – and of how this could be done given Kuwait’s size, current industrial structure and 
economic institutions and, not least, socio-cultural norms.  
  
This is an ideal moment to re-examine these questions, after a number of earlier reports on 
developing Kuwait’s economy whose recommendations have been implemented only partially – 
and sometimes not at all. The reports themselves, while strong on strategic direction and statistical 
content, tended to underplay the specificities of Kuwait’s starting position as a late entrant, along 
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with the complex challenges of institution and capacity building on a system-wide basis. These are 
realities that subsequent research and our own approach, stressing the need to create a national 
innovation ecosystem, more readily acknowledge as key hurdles. However, today’s circumstances 
offer a fresh opportunity. Kuwait has largely weathered the global economic and financial crisis, 
notwithstanding difficulties with individual banks and some investment companies. Other countries 
are now facing acute economic pressures. The recession is providing Kuwait with an opportunity to 
restructure in the light of new knowledge and understanding, in particular of the role of institutions 
and the interlinking and self-reinforcing nature of reform. While other countries tread water, Kuwait 
could lay the foundations for future advance. This is the moment to develop a strategy and 
approach that will offer the country a distinctive means to create Kuwait-specific comparative and 
competitive advantage, adapting the best not only from other Gulf States but from other 
countries. Some of what needs to be done is already in train in the Four Year Development Plan. 
The challenge is to focus and develop still further those strands of policy that would contribute to 
knowledge-economy development. 
  
The project builds on a multimillion-pound research project by The Work Foundation to understand 
how the knowledge economy works and what individuals, firms, economies and governments can 
do better to equip themselves for it. Sponsored by a mix of British companies, the UK government 
and public organisations, the project is in its fourth year. Having recently entered a second major 
phase of work, it is one of the largest and most authoritative in the UK, and regularly feeds into the 
policy of the UK government. KFAS invited The Work Foundation and the LSE – supported by an 
LTE drawn from Kuwaiti institutions (KISR, KU and KFAS) – to scope how their insights would 
apply in Kuwait in general terms, before deciding whether to continue with a further and more 
detailed appraisal. The LSE–Work Foundation team visited Kuwait in March 2010, presented at a 
special seminar and conducted a number of interviews with key decision makers. This report is the 
result.  
  
The report recommends that Kuwait develop its knowledge economy more aggressively. 
The country has a number of important assets on which to build, notably plentiful reserves of 
capital, abundant availability of petroleum, a sophisticated consumer base, a young population, 
small size, and strategic location at the heart of a substantial regional market. We suggest that 
Kuwait create what we term an innovation ecosystem to support the transition to a 
knowledge economy, while recognising both that innovation and firm growth are very much 
trial and error and that there is no single magic bullet that will automatically bring the 
desired results. Rather we recommend a series of small but self-reinforcing steps that will 
cumulatively create both the enabling environment and the institutions of the proposed 
innovation ecosystem, which together will underpin the transition to a knowledge-based 
economy. 
 
Analysis and Findings 
 
Building a knowledge economy is a complex and difficult task. We outline the main elements of an 
innovation ecosystem. This begins with the interlocking role of publicly supported research 
generating the original intellectual capital that supports firm formation and 
entrepreneurship as the driver of original innovation. However, innovation takes place across a 
broad front. Innovative firms will also need to be spun out of existing large state-owned enterprises. 
Small states like Kuwait have to be open to new ideas, the bulk of which necessarily will come from 
abroad. Then there is market development and firm creation. Markets rarely occur 
spontaneously but are created through regulation, procurement, and early adoption by educated, 
risk-taking consumers. Regulation and public procurement need to be seen as crucial parts of the 
ecosystem rather than stand-alone activities. The financial system must support firm 
development and growth. It must be capable of rapidly and flexibly mobilising resource; the most 
innovative firms have treacherously long start-up phases and lack significant assets that can be 
used as collateral for loans – a requirement that the ecosystem must solve. Education must 
provide individuals with the necessary combinations of hard and soft skills along with the cultural 
Kuwait and the Knowledge Economy  
A report prepared for KFAS 
 
© The Work Foundation. 5 
disposition to work, learn and take risks. The extent to which entrepreneurship flourishes in any 
economy or society depends on the facility with which these key institutions interlock in a well-
understood way to support risk taking, firm building and market development.  
 
Although the experiences and policy insights of others are important benchmarks, it is necessary to 
inject a healthy dose of realism when seeking to interpret and apply lessons. The best results 
occur where all the elements in the ecosystem work together and pull in the same direction, but 
necessarily this implies coordination and a systemic approach, while at the same respecting the 
specificities of Kuwait’s position, culture and history. Firm development is tumultuous and 
uncertain, and it needs critical mass along with the establishment of the ecosystem. Without a 
thorough and nuanced understanding of the context in which specific policies and technologies 
have arisen as well as the environment into which they are to be introduced, simple transfer is both 
impossible and in the end inadvisable. 
  
These caveats resonate with particular force in relation to Kuwait. The legacy of four decades of 
buoyant oil revenues has firmly embedded a notion of citizens’ entitlement among Kuwaiti 
nationals. Aspirations and incentives to invest in human capital at primary, secondary and 
university levels have been dulled. The pay-offs from simple supply-side interventions – for 
instance, boosting the provision of finance or improving teacher quality – will not bear nearly as 
much fruit as they should unless they are complemented by both pressure and demand for them. 
This implies higher returns on private sector endeavours and activities, and an understanding by 
officials and politicians of this need. However, the introduction of important structural reforms to 
boost the private sector, at least until the current Four Year Development Plan, has been hindered 
by fears that privatisation will amount to no more than insiders squandering and capturing 
productive national assets. More generally, limited administrative efficiency and a lack of 
transparency can deter firm creation and the demand for finance. All successful capitalist 
economies need to migrate from firms simply using private networks to win business and monitor 
contracts to being able to operate at scale; and scale is only possible if firms can marshal large 
resources – people, finance and suppliers – through formal and impersonal relationships. The rule 
of law and trust in official impartiality are thus vital; good governance is a precondition for growth. 
But reforms aimed at correcting governance failures tend to ignore the fluid, rolling relation 
between law and its enforcement. Middle-ranking officials, for example, need to own the 
importance of transparency and good governance. It takes risks to enforce the law. The incentives 
and reward system within the administration must reflect this truth.  
 
Finally, there is a need to reach a compromise between attracting and adopting existing 
technologies, modifying them for local contexts and attempting focused original research, including 
on frontier technology. The risk is that over-ambition to do the original and frontier research will run 
ahead of the underlying absorptive capacity of the system. A much better strategy is to forge 
alliances with institutions between which there is greater equivalence of capabilities – for example, 
between two evenly matched universities. Our report attempts to identify a number of areas and 
emerging technologies within the grasp of mid-capacity countries that meet these necessary 
conditions. Kuwait cannot expect to jump to the technological frontier in one leap. Careful 
investment in the innovation ecosystem will build up absorptive capacity and narrow the gap with 
what is happening at the frontier of technology – but until this reaches critical mass, results will be 
disappointing.  
 
As the report makes clear, the twin forces of globalisation and the IT revolution are changing 
what has been deemed possible, liberating countries like Kuwait from the old rules of production. 
But at the same time, the playback of responses that served policymakers well in the past is a less 
reliable guide to catch-up today. As innovation becomes more integrated into a global web of 
markets and relationships, policy becomes more difficult to design and monitor at the national level 
alone. Countries, especially small ones with few home-grown capabilities, must be attentive to 
the diversity of the international landscape of innovation, especially the knowledge that is emerging 
from lead markets dotted around the world, and must put in place mechanisms – joint ventures, 
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foreign acquisitions and human capital policies – that link knowledge to local problem-solving 
needs. 
 
There are strategies that latecomers can pursue and have pursued to compete in local and global 
markets. We list five broad headings. There are local optimisers, who adapt products and 
production processes to the distinctive tastes and conditions of local markets that are amongst the 
toughest in the world. There are natural resource vertical integrators, who integrate all the 
segments of the value chain, exploiting their natural resources like oil and gas with a particular 
emphasis on capturing downstream markets. Other strategies include developing as low-cost 
partners (taking advantage of low wages to enhance relations with high-wage firms and customers 
in developed countries in order to secure more value-added activity); as global consolidators 
(exploiting late-mover advantages in mid-tech industries by utilising plants with the newest 
technology or largest scale available, contrasting with Western incumbents that suffer from costly 
legacy systems); or as global first movers (leapfrogging to the global technological frontier 
through the eclectic use of external knowledge).  
  
Paradoxically, our analysis shows how each strategy leverages advantages that are specific and 
are often unavailable to more advanced countries and firms. Our preliminary interviews (we 
provide a full list of interviewees in Appendix B) confirm that the most successful Kuwaiti firms 
have been operating as natural resource vertical integrators or local optimisers. We suggest that 
strategy should focus on these two categories, although there may be some scope for success as 
a global consolidator. 
 
The history of other late economic developers, at least since the Second World War, has 
underlined the importance of achieving scale in operations, especially in more mature markets, in 
which the ability to exploit and enhance a given technology is more important than the ability to 
experiment with radically new alternatives. Small is not necessarily beautiful in the context of 
catch-up. Moreover, Kuwaiti firm creation is currently very weak, partly due to lack of incentives 
and partly due to a weak business environment, so it is hard for one start-up to try its luck let alone 
having a hundred flowers bloom. Policy should therefore follow through on the enabling legislation 
on privatisation, and in particular identify which parts of the state-owned sector could become local 
optimisers and natural resource vertical integrators. Further work needs to be undertaken on how 
the process can gain traction politically via generously priced disposals, employee share-
ownership schemes and, to a lesser extent, management buyouts. Rather than institutions being 
created from scratch, responsibility for policy should be granted to those parts of the bureaucracy 
that have a proven track record for competence and impartiality.  
 
Recommendations  
 
We conclude with a suite of potential policy initiatives in the short and medium terms, under the 
varying categories of the national innovation ecosystem: public research and technology transfer, 
market development and firm creation, finance, education and skills, and openness and 
governance. Our aim has been to build up the private sector as quickly as possible through 
better governance and creating the components of the innovation ecosystem while working 
gradually towards a new social contract based on engagement, learning and work – an 
indispensable part of the wider enabling environment. We see our recommendations as 
interdependent and cumulative in their impact. Privatisation; public procurement; building up 
research capacity; introducing educational selection; alliances with overseas institutions of 
equivalent standing; promoting alliances and joint ventures; greater professionalism in the public 
bureaucracy; making business start-ups easier; creating prizes and incentives to reward change; 
and building up Kuwait’s capacity in intangible asset creation are all among the areas for reform. 
To make reform innovative we have also suggested borrowing and adapting a number of initiatives 
used by other countries, notably Taiwan, Canada and the USA. Kuwait must build up its ecosystem 
capacity, develop its intangibles and begin to develop manu-service companies as local optimisers 
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and natural resource vertical integrators – and this will succeed the more as the wider environment 
enables the necessary cultural change.  
 
There is much to build on within the Four Year Development Plan and from earlier initiatives. The 
Blair Report has suggested important reforms to governance in Kuwait which we believe are 
foundations on which the knowledge economy work can build. 
  
To complete our work we need to: 
 
 Analyse closely the Four Year Development Plan, to foreground and integrate knowledge-
economy strategy initiatives in order to establish any quick wins and to follow up areas 
where our analysis was necessarily incomplete.  
 Do a proper market analysis of sectors and industries in which Kuwait might have a 
competitive and comparative advantage. What are the prospects/scenarios for these 
sectors/industries? What skills and support are they likely to require? 
 Map/scan what others are doing in terms of research and knowledge creation, especially in 
areas that are important to Kuwait. This will allow us to identify opportunities for 
international cooperation and collaboration with different research centres and fruitful 
research directions. 
 Do a comprehensive gap analysis of each of the conditions that constitute an innovation 
ecosystem. For example, in the public research component, where does Kuwait enjoy a 
comparative advantage? How broad or narrow is the knowledge base? To what extent 
does the knowledge base cover the whole value chain?  
 Develop a series of key performance indicators (KPIs) by which progress can be measured, 
drawing on efforts that evaluate innovation in wider systemic and institutional terms. 
 Detail local optimiser and natural resource vertical integration business models so that all 
those who need to understand them can do so. Examine any areas in which there might be 
opportunities for a global consolidator strategy. How can Kuwaiti firms avoid the pitfalls 
associated with mergers and acquisitions (M&As) as they seek to scale up?  
 Map Kuwait’s current stock of firms operating in intangibles, and open up discussion about 
the manu-service business model. 
 Examine how the take-up of financial flows to enterprise can be improved. 
 Offer suggestions for the creation of Kuwaiti selective secondary schools and other 
educational reforms. 
 Scope the possibility of creating a new citizen grant or baby bond as a way of rebasing the 
social contract on rewarding efforts which raise productive capacity, and moving away from 
entitlements. Oil revenues in other oil-producing provinces like Alaska have been used to 
create long-term funds that finance educational bursaries and school and university study, 
along with a range of investments in public goods and infrastructure that will lift long-run 
economic investment and performance. Kuwait might want to consider following suit.  
 Scope emir’s prizes that reward entrepreneurs and innovators who best combine new local 
business models with overseas ideas.  
 Offer a view on sharia-compliant venture capital and finance. 
 
This is an economic and technological roadmap that very much complements the Blair Report’s 
advocacy of governance reform. If implemented it could help sustain and build on the momentum 
of the Four Year Development Plan and the Blair Report, and give Kuwait and Kuwaitis a sense of 
direction and pride. However, the process we visualise will not be possible without dedicated 
support in Kuwait. As part of any next phase of work, we will need to work closely with the LTE to 
assemble a group of local researchers –economists, statisticians and social scientists – who will 
help us determine what data exists, collect new data and mount new research. The mapping of the 
micro-foundations for good policy is an enormous task. We will also aim to deepen our 
relationships with local companies and organisations, so that analyses and recommendations are 
truly iterative and have the greatest possible reach, familiarity and credibility.  
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Although after our visit to Kuwait we are more aware of the challenges, we are also more aware of 
the opportunities. This is the trajectory on which we believe Kuwait must travel. The next phase of 
work is to offer a more detailed blueprint. 
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Section 1 
Introduction 
Economic change in the 21st century is being driven by three big structural changes that have 
emerged over the past 30 years and are accelerating in both scope and scale: 
 
 the rise of technology and knowledge-based industries as major generators of value-added, 
exports and new jobs; 
 the shift in business investment priorities from investment in physical assets to knowledge-
based intangible assets; 
 the growth of an increasingly well-educated and qualified workforce. 
 
The evidence for these changes and the prospects for how they will change in the future are set 
out in more detail below. However, the form, scope and speed of these changes are always 
shaped by national circumstances and structures. How the knowledge economy might develop in 
Kuwait can only be understood in the light of the contemporary situation and realities facing 
Kuwait.  
 
The knowledge-economy concept does not offer an alternative strategic blueprint. It is a means to 
an end, a potential tool for helping implement the strategic vision that Kuwait itself has drawn up by 
offering more options and insights to make that vision a reality than would otherwise be the case. 
 
This report has been drawn up jointly between The Work Foundation and the LSE Kuwait 
Programme with the active help and support of the KFAS. Under the guidance of KFAS a joint 
Work Foundation–LSE team visited Kuwait between 13 and 16 March 2010. The team consisted of 
Mr Will Hutton, executive vice-chair of The Work Foundation; Mr Ian Brinkley, director of the 
Knowledge Economy Programme at The Work Foundation; Mr Philippe Schneider, associate of 
The Work Foundation; and Dr Kristian Coates-Ulrichsen, senior research fellow on the Kuwait 
Programme.  
 
The main purpose of the visit was to give a high-level presentation on the knowledge economy to a 
selected expert audience and to conduct a series of interviews with expert representatives of 
relevant Kuwaiti institutions and organisations (see Appendix A for more details on the seminar). 
The presentation was held on 15 March at the offices of KFAS. The presentation and interviews 
provided sufficient information gathering and hypothesis testing on the knowledge economy in a 
Kuwaiti context to allow this interim report to be drawn up. As one of the conclusions of the high-
level presentation was that options should be explored for a further phase, we have included some 
future options should that be decided as appropriate. 
 
The Case for Embracing the Knowledge Economy  
 
There are a number of compelling reasons for Kuwait to embrace the knowledge economy. Kuwait 
is over-dependent on the fluctuating global price of oil for its revenues. As we show in more detail 
later, Kuwait is one of the least diversified economies in the Gulf and one of the most volatile in the 
world. This makes developing a private business sector even harder; it complicates fiscal planning 
and makes it difficult for policymakers to set out long-term objectives when government revenues 
are so volatile. Another reason is rapid population growth, which carries fiscal risks as lavish 
government spending on citizen benefits may require increasingly large budget deficits that 
become unsustainable in the medium to longer term. Growing awareness of environmental 
degradation and resource insecurity also provide reasons for Kuwait to invest in human capital and 
thereby lessen its reliance on hydrocarbons.  
 
Knowledge-intensive industries benefit from early-mover advantage. Once established, they are 
very difficult to dislodge. Elsewhere in the Gulf, the pace and scale of investment in the knowledge 
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economy have been considerable. Developments such as the $10-billion-endowed King Abdullah 
University of Science and Technology in Saudi Arabia, the creation of Education City in Qatar and 
the establishment of NYU Abu Dhabi are all potential game-changers that are reshaping the 
parameters of knowledge creation in the Gulf. There is, however, genuine scope for a distinctive 
Kuwaiti model of the knowledge economy to emerge, based on local ownership, alignment with 
labour market and educational reform, and full integration into national plans.1 The other Gulf 
States have prioritised enclave-based agreements with Western institutions that have had only 
limited diffusion into the wider economy. A distinctive Kuwaiti model of knowledge agglomeration 
therefore holds great potential if it is geared directly to meeting local objectives as set out in the 
national vision.2  
 
And last but not least, Kuwait must begin to look beyond the petroleum age regardless of when in 
the future that faces its final curtain call. This might sound counter-intuitive as the depletion of 
Kuwait’s oil reserves is not imminent. Thus the 2009 BP Statistical Review of World Energy 
estimated a reserves-to-production ratio of 99.6 years, meaning that Kuwaiti reserves are likely to 
outlast most international competitors’. However, this lack of urgency needs to be tempered by the 
possibility that depletion and declines in production elsewhere would require Kuwait to bring 
forward its production and that petroleum could lose its present value as a result of technical 
progress well ahead of the predicted time of depletion.3 A combination of technological innovation 
and environmental considerations is accelerating the shift towards post-carbon alternatives. This 
places the onus on hydrocarbon-dependent states such as Kuwait to take measures to cushion the 
eventual twilight of petroleum by increasing adaptive capacity and broadening their economic base 
– as other Gulf States are doing.4  
 
As a comparatively high-income developing country, Kuwait does not lack the resources to bring 
about this economic transition. 
 
Defining the Knowledge Economy 
 
“The knowledge economy” is a term widely used around the world, but hardly ever defined. 
Judging from world media stories (from the English-speaking press) virtually every nation either 
thinks it is already a knowledge economy or aspires to be one. Some such as Korea have 
established a Ministry for the Knowledge Economy. Others such as Ireland have developed an 
explicit knowledge-economy strategy.  
 
A good working definition was drawn up by the UK Economic and Research Council (ESRC) in 
2005: “economic success is increasingly based on the effective utilisation of intangible assets such 
as knowledge, skills, and innovative potential as the key resource for competitive advantage. The 
term ‘knowledge economy’ is used to describe this emerging economic structure.” 
 
These definitions capture two important features of the knowledge economy. Firstly, the shift 
towards a knowledge-based economy affects all sectors – low- and high-tech, knowledge-intensive 
and less knowledge-intensive, large and small, public and private. Secondly, the knowledge 
economy is a transition, what some have described as a “soft discontinuity”. It is part of a long-term 
process going on for decades if not centuries. 
 
                                               
1 Michael Herb (2009) “A Nation of Bureaucrats: Political Participation and Economic Diversification in 
Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates.” International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 41. 
2 
Dr Moudi Al-Homoud, Minister of Education, and Dr Yousef Al-Ebraheem, Amiri Diwan, Kuwait and the 
Knowledge Economy seminar, 15 March 2010. 
3
 BP (2009) BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2009, p. 6. www.bp.com/statisticalreview 
4
 Vincent Romani (2009) “The Politics of Higher Education in the Middle East: Problems and Prospects.” 
Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University, Middle East Brief No. 39, May. 
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Table 1.1 Knowledge-based industries defined by the OECD 
Market-based 
knowledge industries 
Public-based 
knowledge industries 
Other market-based 
industries 
Other public-based 
industries 
High- to medium-high-
tech-based 
manufacturing 
High-tech services 
(telecommunications, 
computer services, 
R&D services) 
Financial services 
Business services (real 
estate, advertising, 
accountancy, legal, 
technical, consultancy) 
Cultural and creative 
industries 
Education 
Health and social work 
Low- to medium-low-
tech-based 
manufacturing 
Distribution, hospitality 
Transport 
Other services (dry-
cleaning, hairdressing, 
refuse collection) 
Recreational and cultural 
services* 
Public administration 
Manufacturing classified by R&D intensity; services classified by ICT use and employment of graduates.  
*Recreational and cultural industries recognised as knowledge-based by EU but not OECD, and includes libraries and 
museums. 
 
In our work on the knowledge economy many of the statistics used follow the OECD standard 
definition of technology- and knowledge-intensive industrial sectors (see Table 1.1). These include 
R&D-intensive manufacturing and services, and service industries such as business, high tech, 
financial, education and healthcare that make above average use of ICTs and are large employers 
of graduate labour. 
 
These industry-based definitions are useful for describing the knowledge economy in a statistical 
sense, but they also have limitations. As we show below, the nature of a knowledge economy 
means that conventional industrial boundaries become porous and the conventional distinctions 
become increasingly blurred. The OECD industry definition can only therefore be an approximation 
of the scope and scale of a knowledge-based economy. 
 
The potential significance of knowledge-based intangibles such as R&D, copyright, brand equity, 
design, human and organisational capital has been acknowledged for decades but primarily in an 
obscure debate on how best to measure the value of firms’ assets for accounting purposes. The 
recognition of the macroeconomic significance of the shift towards intangibles is more recent, and 
their effective measurement even more so. Table 1.2 shows the standard definitions used by 
OECD and academic researchers.5 
  
                                               
5
 These definitions are also used in the EU-funded Coinvest programme looking at intangible investment 
across the EU and are likely to form the basis of an internationally agreed set of statistical measures of 
intangibles in the future. 
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Table 1.2 Tangible and intangible forms of investment 
Tangibles Intangibles Examples 
Buildings Computerised information Software and databases 
Plant and machinery Innovative property Scientific and non-scientific R&D 
Mineral exploration, copyright, licence costs 
New products from the finance industry 
New architectural and engineering designs 
Vehicles Economic competencies Brand equity (strategic advertising plus market 
research) 
Firm-specification human capital (employer-
provided training) 
Organisational structure (share of management 
time spent on strategy plus cost of external 
consultants) 
 
The Drivers 
 
The primary driver is rising demand for high-value-added services and goods from wealthier, more 
sophisticated, diverse and demanding consumers – either as private individuals or through what 
citizens now expect from collective provision from public services. As societies become richer and 
better educated, demand shifts towards high-value-added goods and services and what the UK 
Treasury6 has identified as the “high demand society”. This includes rising demand for education, 
healthcare and cultural services, and increasingly services related to the environment. Consumers 
are increasingly demanding not just personalised services, but what some have termed 
“experiential” services.7 
 
In addition, business-to-business activity has seen a huge rise in supporting services through a 
network of intermediaries – firms and organisations that specialise in high tech, design, advertising, 
consultancy, training, financial, accountancy, expert labour supply and other services.  
 
The great enablers are powerful and cheap computers and the “general purpose” ICTs coupled 
with mass higher education. The current phase in the development of the knowledge economies 
across the world dates from the early 1980s and the rapid dissemination of very cheap and very 
powerful computers. The role of general purpose technologies is discussed in more detail below. 
 
The accelerator on both the demand and supply side has been globalisation, creating markets of 
scale and also diversity and facilitating the flow of ideas, concepts, technologies, capital and 
people. For instance, it took over 90 years for the telegram to spread to 80 per cent of developing 
countries whereas the diffusion of the mobile phone occurred in only 16 years.8 In other words, had 
eastern Europe, China and India all remained in effect closed economies we would have seen 
similar changes, but at a slower pace. 
                                               
6
 HM Treasury (2006) Long Term Opportunities and Challenges for the UK: Analysis for the 2007 CSR. HM 
Treasury. 
7 Chris Voss and Leonieke Zomerdijk (2007) “Innovation in Experiential Services – An Empirical View”. In 
DTI (ed.), Innovation in Services. DTI, pp. 97–134. 
8
 World Bank (2008) Global Economic Prospects: Technology Diffusion in the Developing World. World 
Bank. 
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General Purpose Technologies 
 
“General purpose technologies” (GPTs) have their roots in technology, but can be technologically 
advanced products, processes (such as lean production) or services. Like electricity, the internal 
combustion engine or the internet, GPTs have the power to change the organisation and structure 
of whole economies and not just particular industries. Some definitions identify between eight and 
ten GPTs in the 20th century compared with up to five in the preceding 150 years.  
 
We can expect many more in the 21st century.9 One reason for the speeding up is that innovation 
stands on the shoulders of the stock of scientific and technological knowledge and that stock is 
expanding very rapidly across the globe – so rapidly that simply keeping pace with what is 
genuinely new in the world is a major challenge. Inventions in particular areas can happen very 
quickly after an initial breakthrough, and can include rediscoveries of processes that could not be 
developed further at the time because they depended on other discoveries. 
 
The US National Academy of Engineering has identified a series of major engineering challenges, 
from the practical application of nanotechnology and fusion power, carbon sequestration, health 
informatics and customised medicines, to cyberspace security and enhanced virtual reality, to 
personalised learning.10 Some organisations refer to “enabling technologies” that cut across 
conventional research boundaries through combined innovations in, say, optical, chemical and 
biological applications in areas such as healthcare.11 The OECD identifies five new science and 
technology (S&T) growth areas for the future: health, environment, electronic communications, 
biotechnology and nanotechnology.12 These technological challenges and growth areas are 
summarised in Table 1.3. 
 
Table 1.3 Technological challenges and growth areas in the 2020 knowledge economy 
20th-/21st-century GPTs 21st-century great challenges 21st-century new growth areas 
20th century: 
Internal combustion engine 
Electricity  
Motor vehicle 
Aeroplane  
Mass production  
Computer  
Lean production 
Internet 
Biotechnology 
 
21st century: 
Nanotechnology 
Nanotechnologies 
Energy from fusion 
Advanced materials 
Carbon sequestration 
Managing the nitrogen cycle 
Water 
Health informatics 
Durable customised infrastructure 
Customised medicine 
The brain 
Cyberspace security 
Enhanced virtual reality 
Personalised learning 
Health 
Environment 
Electronic communications 
Biotechnology 
Nanotechnology  
Sources: Lipsey et al., Economic Transformations; US Academy of Engineering, Grand Challenges; OECD Science and 
Technology Indicators 2009. 
                                               
9
 Richard Lipsey, Kenneth Carlaw and Clifford Bekar (2005) Economic Transformations: General Purpose 
Technologies and Long-Term Economic Growth. Oxford University Press. 
10
 US National Academy of Engineering (2008) Grand Challenges for Engineering. National Academy of 
Sciences. 
11
 Scottish Technology Group (2009) Towards a Brighter Future. Scottish Enterprise. 
12
 OECD (2009) OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 2009. www.oecd.org/sti/scoreboard 
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Table 1.4 Technological adaptive capacity may restrict the diffusion of future technologies 
 
Source: Silberglitt et al., The Global Technology Revolution 2020.  
Blue line indicates that the technology requires increased sophistication. 
A recent report by RAND13 identifies 56 emerging technologies expected to be feasible and 
marketable by 2020 and selects the 16 judged to have the greatest technical and commercial 
promise. It assesses the amount of absorptive capacity a country needs to take advantage of each 
technology and the likelihood that a panel of countries will do so by 2020, as shown in Table 1.4. 
The report is necessarily schematic: it does not assess which technologies a country with Kuwait’s 
economic and political structures is in a position to exploit; nor does it factor in the dynamic 
possibility that weak absorptive capacity can be strengthened by institution-building mechanisms 
over time. Nonetheless it provides a useful snapshot of the prospects for advancement based on 
current data and a salutary reminder that countries must retain some realism and cut their 
technological coat to suit their cloth. 
                                               
13
 Richard Silberglitt, Philip Anton, David Howell, Anny Wong et al. (2006) The Global Technology Revolution 2020. 
RAND. 
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The Knowledge Economy: The Evidence to Date 
 
Across the OECD, the number of people working in knowledge-intensive and technologically 
advanced industries grew from 50 million to 150 million between 1970 and 2005. These industries 
have been the big drivers behind jobs and value added. Figure 1.1 shows changes in the share of 
value-added across the EU15 and the United States over this period, comparing the knowledge-
intensive service industries against more traditional services such as retailing and hospitality and 
the manufacturing sector. 
 
The biggest contribution has come from the growth of knowledge-intensive business services. 
Between 1990 and 2005 employment in these industries grew by 67 per cent across the OECD, 
followed by growth of nearly 40 per cent in public-based health and education services. In contrast, 
financial services grew very modestly, by less than 8 per cent. High-tech manufacturing saw 
employment fall. Overall, employment growth in the technological and knowledge-intensive sectors 
was two and a half times faster than in the rest of the economy over this period (29 per cent 
compared with 12 per cent). 
 
Intangible Investment 
 
Across all sectors, organisations have invested massively in knowledge-based intangibles. In the 
business sector, economies such as the USA, UK, France and the Nordics invest as much in 
intangibles as they do in tangibles. This is shown in Figure 1.2. These figures are for the business 
sector – they would be even higher if they included the public and other non-market sectors. It is 
the ability to exploit these intangible assets effectively that is a key feature of successful knowledge 
economies. 
 
These measures of intangibles are a significant advance on previous estimates, which were 
confined to total investment in R&D as a share of GDP. The OECD in the past has also produced 
estimates for investment in knowledge assets based on a composite estimate of spending on R&D, 
ICT and higher education.14 One weakness of the measures is that most are still limited to the 
market sector, so understate investment in intangibles by economies with large public sectors.15  
 
Knowledge Economy and Industrial Boundaries 
 
The knowledge economy does not respect industrial boundaries, most notably between 
manufacturing and services. We have coined the phrase “manu-services” to describe the 
emergence of a new industrial sector where high-value-added services are increasingly integrated 
with high-value-added manufacturing. Examples include firms such as Rolls Royce, which now 
makes more profit and value-added from the services that complement its advanced engines, and 
has set up a specialist services division exploiting its world expertise in manufacturing advanced 
power supply systems. The most common services offered by manu-service companies in general 
are design and development services and systems solutions. 
 
Recent research16 suggests that while up to 60 per cent of US manufacturing firms can be 
described as manu-services, only 1 per cent of manufacturing firms in China have adopted this 
                                               
14
 OECD Science and Technology Indicators 2007. The estimates relate to 2004 and have not been updated 
in the latest STI indicators published in 2009. 
15
 A further definitional issue is whether it is public expenditure on higher education that counts or the public 
sector’s creation of intangible assets such as spending on training the public sector workforce, design, brand 
equity and so on; or whether it is both after allowing for possible double-counting. 
16
 Andy Neely (2009) “The Financial Consequences of Servitization of Manufacturing.” AIM Research 
Working Paper. 
Kuwait and the Knowledge Economy  
A report prepared for KFAS 
 
© The Work Foundation. 16 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Growth of knowledge based service industries in Europe and US 1970-2005 
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Figure 1.2 Business investment in intangible knowledge-based assets across the OECD 
Source: Australian Productivity Council 2009. 
All figures are share of market sector GDP. Finland excludes financial sector; US excludes farming. US average of 
1998–2000; Germany, France, Italy and Spain are 2004; Japan average of 2000–5; Netherlands and Canada 2005. 
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Figure 1.3 Share of manufacturing firms that could be described as “manu services” 
Source: Neely, “Financial Consequences of Servitization of Manufacturing”.  
The term “manu-services” comes from The Work Foundation knowledge economy programme. 
All figures are 2004; UK figure is for Great Britain. 
model. The trend is not confined to the OECD. Both Malaysia and Singapore have consciously 
moved towards manu-services because they recognise that “pure manufacturing” will struggle to 
compete not just with China but with the next wave of low-wage producers.  
 
Figure 1.3 shows estimates for shares of manu-service companies. These figures understate the 
importance of manu-service companies as on average they were two and a half times as large as 
“pure” manufacturing companies. Manu-service models are most common among large firms, but 
significant shares of smaller manufacturing firms – about a third on average – had also adapted the 
model.  
 
The evidence from the OECD economies set out above is compelling. Knowledge-based 
economies have, without exception, expanded their knowledge-intensive service sectors, have 
invested heavily in knowledge-based intangibles and have expanded the educated share of the 
workforce.  
 
A key question is how far these lessons are transferable to non-OECD economies. Economic 
processes are the same in all economies, but the context in which they operate varies significantly. 
Moreover, even within the OECD, recognition of the importance of the knowledge economy has 
been comparatively recent. Standing where we are now, we can see what has happened and why, 
but it was less obvious at the time. OECD economies are still in the process of bringing some of 
their own policies, structures, institutions and statistical measures into line with economic reality.  
 
A strong private sector is essential, but the relative size and strength of public and private sectors 
vary considerably. Both the Nordics and North American economies have developed highly 
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successful knowledge-based economies, but the former have large public sectors and strong 
welfare states and the latter relatively small public sectors and weaker welfare states.  
 
More important appears to be the relative strength, effectiveness and efficiency of public 
institutions and their ability to work effectively with the private sector. Knowledge economies are 
based on the role of business-to-business and consumer-to-business intermediaries. Those that 
can bridge the private and public sectors effectively in transferring knowledge and driving 
innovation and technological development in both directions are critical. This is a common finding 
from both OECD and non-OECD examples.  
 
Many OECD and non-OECD economies have set R&D targets as a share of GDP. However, the 
growth of the knowledge economy over the past 30 years has been much more strongly 
associated with increased innovation and technological adaptation than with increased shares of 
R&D spending.17 R&D is important, but investment in other equally important knowledge-based 
intangibles may be even more so. 
 
R&D spending by the private sector is strongly influenced by industrial structure, specialisation and 
ownership – all features difficult to change. Most OECD economies have switched support towards 
R&D tax credits, but the evidence on their success in generating additional investment is limited. 
One problem is that what firms regard as R&D tends to put much more emphasis on development 
and often includes investment in knowledge-based intangibles other than those in the official 
definitions.  
 
Policymakers have therefore moved away from targets, which often lack a clear rationale and often 
fail to take account of the structural constraints, and increasingly focused on improving innovation 
outcomes rather than inputs.18 An important feature is the receptiveness and ability to absorb 
technologies, ideas and practices coming from outside. This may to some extent offset weak 
domestic investment in R&D – in effect, economies can import some of their intellectual property 
requirements. The ability to do this has greatly increased as a consequence of globalisation, 
increased mobility of high-skilled labour, and ICT and other technological advances. 
 
Economies such as Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Taiwan are making successful transitions 
towards OECD knowledge-based economies. All these approaches were top down and required a 
degree of consensus and “buy-in” across civil society and business elites – plans were drawn up 
and put into action in relatively short time periods with substantial public investment. These 
economies were able to build on relatively strong private sectors and strong public corporations. 
They focused heavily on IT-related services and production and, in the case of Malaysia and 
Singapore, on imported knowledge from multinational linkages. However, their success also 
depended on identifying national characteristics and features around which they could build 
success and expertise. These national differences and specifics were as important as the common 
features. 
 
There are some common features of knowledge-intensive economies, some fairly obvious, such as 
the steady increases in better-qualified and better-educated workforces, and others less so, such 
as the importance of a diverse and “high-demand” consumer base. However, OECD knowledge-
based economies differ significantly in terms of industrial structure, institutional arrangements and 
social features. This suggests the same goals can be achieved with different means. This gives 
non-OECD economies a wide choice of potential routes, but also makes it harder to give a simple 
                                               
17
 R&D spending across the OECD is no higher as a share of GDP today than it was in 1985. 
18
 The clearest example is the EU’s commitment to increasing R&D spending to 3 per cent of GDP, made at 
the Lisbon Summit in 2000, to be achieved within 10 years. The EU has made no progress towards this 
target because it had no clear rationale – other than overtaking the USA – and completely failed to take 
account of industrial structure. 
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set of guidelines from experience elsewhere as to which route might be best. The national context 
is very important. The next section reviews previous reports on Kuwait. 
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Section 2 
Previous Reports on Kuwait  
 
We have reviewed some of the previous attempts to set out a strategy for the Kuwait economy, 
although the team were unable to access some others. Below, we set out some comments in more 
detail on approaches that have been used in the past.  
 
There are two reasons why these reports have not led to a better outcome for the Kuwait economy. 
Firstly, there are long-standing economic, social and political obstacles, which we touch on in the 
body of this report. Secondly, while many of the reports have excellent analyses and sensible 
recommendations, they also have weaknesses. We identify five common weaknesses below: 
 
 None has really taken a systems approach, ignoring the institutional basis of the 
knowledge economy. They have tended to understate the uncertainty and difficulty 
surrounding innovation as a dynamic process, and its corresponding market failures.  
 The full significance of globalisation is underplayed in earlier reports. As we argue, 
inward flows of foreign direct investment (FDI), technology and talent are crucial to the 
knowledge economy of small latecomers; globalisation has changed what is feasible 
but also brought new trade-offs.  
 The earlier reports do not make clear the distinctive challenges and 
strategies confronting latecomers. High-profile examples of successful national and 
regional economies, based on blockbuster licences on university-patented research and 
technology transfer to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and start-ups, have 
become a gold standard and universal blueprint for policymakers but have limited 
relevance in many settings.19 Different stages of development will call for different 
organisational forms, different roles for universities and research, different relations 
between entrepreneurs and financial markets and different processes of firm selection. 
As much of this work has emerged only in the last few years, it is hardly surprising that 
it has not featured in policy discussions. For instance, the five-strategies discussion in 
the upgrading section in our interim report is based on wholly new work.20 
 No report is sufficiently forward-looking in anticipating the rise of GPTs and 
understanding the implications of emerging technologies for Kuwait. 
 Microeconomic assumptions are incorrectly specified, resulting in inappropriate policy 
recommendations: implicitly the tendency to push a simple model of rationality and 
motivation beyond its appropriate domain has limited the ability of policymakers to 
understand a plethora of consumption and investment decisions.21 
  
The MIT–Harvard High-Value-Added Strategy 
In the early 1990s, a joint report was produced by MIT, Harvard, KU and KISR looking at future 
challenges for developing the Kuwait economy. The report called for a “high-value-added strategy” 
based on (i) improving revenues from oil extraction and (ii) building up human capital and 
expanding the financial sector. The report did not, however, discuss the innovation system in which 
this could take place, although in fairness policy thinking on innovation and innovation systems 
was much less advanced than it is today. Without an analysis and understanding of how the 
innovation ecosystem works, it is hard to implement even the most carefully crafted 
recommendations. This is as true for Kuwait today as it was then. 
                                               
19
 Richard Lester (2005) “Universities, Innovation, and the Competitiveness of Local Economies: A Summary 
Report from the Local Innovation Systems Project – Phase I.” MIT Industrial Performance Center Working 
Paper 05-010. 
20
 Some of these insights have been formalised in the branch of economics associated with the new growth 
theory. 
21
 Arguably this critique applies with most force to the Blair analysis. 
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“State of Kuwait: Energising the Private Sector” Report 
 
In 2001, the World Bank published its "State of Kuwait: Energising the Private Sector", a report that 
built on and expanded the vision of the1995 Country Economic Memorandum to diversify and 
privatise the Kuwaiti economy. One of its major contributions was a comprehensive survey of 
private sector firms that still today provides an unprecedented snapshot of the condition and 
character of the private sector. Large parts of section 4 below draw on this evidence.  
 
Amongst the number of recommendations to give the private sector a greater role in the economy, 
several stand out: adoption of a negative list approach to regulation and the creation of a fully 
representative task force to assess the appropriateness of major regulations; overhaul and 
replacement of the Kafala system with more flexible work permits: liberalisation of the banking and 
financial sector; simplification of commercial laws, especially those relating to procurement, 
industrial licences and land acquisition; maximising potential gains from globalisation through a 
more aggressive stance on WTO negotiations and the establishment of an Investment Promotion 
Bureau; greater involvement of the private sector in downstream oil activities, the appointment of 
an ICT Czar and the fast-tracking of telecommunications deregulation; and ideas to reframe the 
social welfare commitments of the Kuwaiti state. While none of these recommendations is 
particularly novel in isolation, they nonetheless add up to a highly concrete and coherent reform 
package.  
 
In hindsight, "State of Kuwait: Energising the Private Sector" was ahead of its time, published 
against a backdrop of record high oil prices and fiscal reserves that possibly suppressed pressures 
for change and the case for smaller government and privatisation. An accompanying evaluation of 
how far the government had implemented recommendations made by the IMF in its 1993 report 
"Options for Fiscal Reform" underscored this trade-off: of the 35 recommendations proposed in 
1993 only three had been fully implemented by 2001. A further two had been implemented but 
introduced with significant concessions, and five had been only partially implemented. The rest had 
been shelved or deferred for further investigation. 
 
On the other hand, the report was very much sui generis and a product of its time: its rather one-
sided focus on IT and telecommunications seems rather quaint and quixotic from today's vantage 
point of an intervening dotcom bubble and a more hard-headed reassessment of the sector's 
potential and limits. More importantly, other sectors have emerged in that time to give policymakers 
a wider set of options than could have been imagined a decade ago. 
 
The report also left unanswered a number of important questions: delinking the social allowance 
from public sector employment was rightly identified as a first-order, if not existential, issue, but 
apart from fleeting references to a new "Compact with Kuwait" and a brief discussion of the Alaska 
Permanent Fund, it was not developed. This is where policy innovations such as flexicurity, citizen 
grants/baby bonds and livelihood insurance could build on the World Bank's insights, forming a 
“golden triangle” of (i) labour market flexibility, (ii) economic security and (iii) rights and obligations 
of citizenship.  
 
Similarly, while the report called for privatisation and foreign investment, it did not specify what 
shape this should take: support for a few large firms or a flotilla of SMEs, encouragement of joint 
ventures or entirely owned FDI operating in export enclaves. Evidence suggests that these choices 
are not interchangeable but entail important trade-offs and must fit local conditions (some tentative 
observations are offered later).  
 
Finally, notwithstanding the number of recommendations offered to improve business 
competitiveness, some of the assumptions – some obvious, some hidden – upon which its 
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understanding of legal reform and economic performance were based are problematic: its 
tendency to reduce regulation to the sum of rules found in statute and treat it like a piece of 
technology ignores the host environment in which it must be embedded – for instance, whether 
strategic actors have adequate incentives to enforce and obey regulation.  
 
The World Bank and the Knowledge Economy Index 
 
In 2002, the World Bank Institute produced an overview report on knowledge economies and the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) economies. This outlined some of the features of knowledge-
based economies across the OECD and proposed a number of indicators grouped into four pillars 
(institutions and incentives, human capital investment, innovation systems, and electronic 
communications) that would allow economies to chart their “KE [knowledge-economy] readiness”. 
These indices are published annually in an international league table called the Knowledge 
Economy Index (KEI). However, such measures have disadvantages. They are often a mixture of 
“hard” and “soft” indicators, some moving frequently and others influenced by the economic cycle. 
As such, they can move in odd and unpredictable ways. The KEI indicators are useful, but as a 
basis for analysis and policy guidance they are also limited. By themselves they do not provide 
enough insight into innovation systems to guide policymakers on the often complicated, 
interrelated and incremental changes required to develop over time the sort of system needed to 
build a knowledge-based economy. 
 
The Blair Report  
 
The Blair Report sets out a list of ambitions and desired outcomes – for example, unleashing 
entrepreneurialism. Its calls for greater capabilities in the prime minister’s office, more 
professionalisation of the civil service, more accountability and substantial educational reforms are 
well argued. However, we think there are other economic options for a small latecomer state that 
could be explored in more detail, and these are set out later in this report. Moreover, a broad 
strategy report of this nature will not have the detailed understanding of what constitutes a potential 
knowledge-economy strategy – the processes that underpin an innovation ecosystem and the 
business models that might be adopted. 
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Section 3 
The Innovation Ecosystem 
 
For the purposes of analytical simplicity, the framework presents innovation as a dynamic and 
interdependent process whereby researchers and entrepreneurs experiment with different ideas 
and technologies, and so generate variety. Then follows a selection process signalling to the rest 
of the system which ones to back. Successful ideas expand, drawing more resources, while 
unsuccessful ones are forced to exit.22 The process is influenced not only by technical 
considerations and formal institutions but by shared social norms and value systems – especially 
those concerning attitudes towards risk, failure, social mobility and entrepreneurship. 
 
To equate innovation with only S&T systems and R&D is mistaken. It overlooks how, at its 
core, innovation is an economic act in which the capacity to create a new product or service is only 
worthwhile if there is adequate demand. In fact, research and entrepreneurship operate according 
to very different cultural and institutional logics – one reason why systems with an undoubted 
scientific pedigree have fallen short on translating advantages into advanced positions in new 
industries. Bridging this gap has given rise to so-called “translational infrastructure” – for instance, 
the Fraunhofer Gesellschaft in Germany, ITRI in Taiwan, ETRI in South Korea and TNO in the 
Netherlands.23  
 
Entrepreneurs have been variously held accountable for historic slowdowns if they are too few and 
great leaps in economic growth if they are in abundance. The extent to which entrepreneurship 
takes root and flowers in any economy or society depends on the cost and availability of inputs, 
market size and ease of appropriating the fruits of its success relative to other lucrative if socially 
less valuable activities, from legal rent-seeking to outright criminal activity.24 It also depends on 
institutions of good governance: a public administration that plainly aims to serve the public good 
rather than aggrandise itself, and fosters confidence in the security and predictability of economic 
interactions.25 
 
On another level, it is the similarities, not the differences, between research and entrepreneurship 
that stand out. Activity is best marshalled through multiple, small-scale experimentation – a 
philosophy that is shared by organisations as diverse as Google and the Howard Hughes Medical 
Institute (openness).26 Both tolerate early failure and reward long-term success. But pluralism 
must be accompanied by disciplining mechanisms that review projects, follow up on successes 
and recognise failures before they become a drag on the economy, as demonstrated by the 
baleful, lumbering experience of many national champions around the world. Important here is the 
role of demand: discriminating consumers – public and private – will not only give innovators an 
early customer base from which to develop their products but are also more likely to reject poor or 
substandard ideas (demand). In a similar way, competition increases pressures on firms to 
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develop, adapt and adopt better ways of doing things – to stay ahead of, or just keep up with, rivals 
(competition).27  
   
Demand and competition are also important to the extent that they generate the price and quantity 
information without which successful entrepreneurial hunches cannot be formed. This is why the 
“right prices” matter as guides to enterprise to change the allocation of resources in productivity-
enhancing ways.  
 
By implication, the system must be capable of rapidly and flexibly mobilising resources. In 
particular, growing firms, especially in high-tech sectors, are hungry users of skills. Technical 
competence alone is not enough, however. Demand for generic skills – the ability to adapt to and 
solve new problems – has also increased;28 and at a time when disciplinary walls are tumbling 
down – in emerging areas from nanotechnology and synthetic biology to business activities such 
as manu-services – there has never been more need for interdisciplinary thinking.29  
  
Similarly, finance must be fit for purpose, oriented to the fact that many of the most innovative firms 
have treacherously long start-up phases and lack significant assets that can be used as collateral 
for loans. A concern for entrepreneurs is that equity markets are too impatient and traditional banks 
are too cautious, as evidenced by the “Valley of Death” gaps in investment at the seed and early 
stages.  
  
An important conclusion is that in small economies, positive conditions are unlikely to exist if only 
domestic institutions and actors are taken into account. We develop this conclusion in more detail 
in section 4 of this report. 
 
A stylistic representation of an innovation ecosystem is set out in Figure 3.1, developed from the 
work of the UK’s National Endowment for the Sciences and Arts (NESTA). The figure shows how 
the functions of an innovation ecosystem – openness, public research, access to finance, 
competition, demand and skills – relate to each other. This framework could be used to help 
describe and assess the Kuwaiti innovation ecosystem. 
 
Innovation Does Not Occur Spontaneously 
 
The overall process is, of course, not smooth, effortless or always efficiency-enhancing. Pervasive 
uncertainty means that most experiments will turn out to be expensive flops. Individuals exploring 
the unknown may not engage in the search process to establish what is commercially viable, as 
they hesitate to incur the costs that can also benefit competitors. Instead, the temptation is to free-
ride on others’ adventurousness.30 Thus one long-run study estimates that innovators themselves 
capture only 2.2 per cent of the total value of their innovations, with the balance of the social 
benefit going to other producers and to consumers of products that use the innovations.31 Besides, 
limited access to information can cause individuals and firms to herd, basing decisions on how 
other firms are seen to be reacting – a recipe for booms and busts. Traditional supply-side 
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Figure 3.1 The innovation ecosystem 
Source: NESTA with an application to the UK 
measures (e.g. public subsidies for R&D and temporary granting of monopolies) and the 
increasingly creative use of demand-side policies (e.g. prizes, public procurement and regulation) 
may be vital to help overcome market failures. Measures may target not just the carrying out of 
R&D but also the training of personnel, the introduction of automation and IT, the establishment of 
brand-name products and energy conservation.32 
 
Overcoming inertia and built-in resistance to innovation is another challenge. Vested interests have 
fewer degrees of freedom than start-ups, making it harder for them to accommodate “disruptive” 
alternatives. Inefficiencies may accumulate insidiously on the back of specialised and asset-
specific investments. As incumbents are not typically compensated by those who displace them, 
their only last resort is to use politics or other means to cling on to their privileges, thereby 
retarding the march of technological progress.  
  
The Role of Context and Appropriate Institutions  
 
Finally, a bundle of institutional attributes that are appropriate for one setting may have limitations 
or elements that make them inappropriate for another. This leads to three conclusions. 
                                               
32
 On demand-side measures, see Thomas Kalil (2006) “Prizes for Technological Innovation.” Hamilton 
Foundation Discussion Paper 2006-08. See also Luke Georghiou (2007) “Demanding Innovation: Lead 
Markets, Public Procurement and Innovation.” NESTA Provocation 02. 
Kuwait and the Knowledge Economy  
A report prepared for KFAS 
 
© The Work Foundation. 27 
 
Firstly, in small economies, positive conditions are unlikely to exist if only domestic institutions and 
actors are taken into account (see section 4 for a more in-depth discussion). Secondly, different 
forms of coordination will be necessary depending on whether a technology is in its infancy or 
maturity, and whether the innovation is radical or incremental. Thirdly, policies for ecosystems that 
are distant from the technological frontier will look necessarily different from those at the cutting 
edge. For instance, research in medium-capacity countries will typically focus on applied research 
or exploratory developments – fields that lie somewhere in between the extremes of pure science 
on the one hand, and advanced development on the other hand. This will have a number of 
implications for the character and configuration of the research activity: the “search” behind the 
research; the objective of the research agent; the expected output; the performance measures by 
which output is evaluated; the time horizon involved; the techniques employed; the qualifications of 
the researchers; and the size of the research effort.33  
 
Another area in which distance to the frontier will lead to differential policies for innovation is 
competition. On the one hand, firms have little incentive to innovate if they are not stimulated by 
competition; on the other, too much competition discourages innovation as firms are not able to 
reap the benefits of their efforts. But whereas firms at the frontier can escape competition by 
innovating, no such comfort exists for laggard firms. As leapfrogging is difficult – one must learn to 
walk before one can run – it makes little difference whether they innovate or not, since they will still 
face competitors that can produce similar goods at similar prices.34 One implication is that 
competition policy can be more lenient towards oligopolies and some forms of infant industry 
protection when an economy or sector is catching up (and incumbent firms will invest more when 
rents are guaranteed) than when the gap has been closed (when powerful incumbents may abuse 
their position to trample on helpless innovators on whom productivity growth depends), and the 
real issues pertain to the choice of tariffs or subsidies to support development.  
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Section 4 
An Unfinished Project: The Continuing Need for Diversification 
 
Kuwait must tackle head-on the problems of unproductive entrepreneurship that have become 
embedded in its political economy over the past four decades. As of 2010, petroleum accounted for 
nearly half of GDP, 95 per cent of export revenues and 95 per cent of government income.35 These 
figures are high, even by regional comparison, and reflect in part the slower progress towards 
economic diversification relative to the other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. Decisive 
political action is required to strip away the layers of rent-seeking behaviour and lay the 
groundwork for the transition to a productive, value-added economic model.36 This will not be an 
easy task as it requires the reformulation of the contract between state and society. There is, 
however, growing consensus that the present model of citizen welfare cannot continue in its 
existing format and that thorough reform is necessary.37 Kuwaiti stakeholders need to reach 
agreement on what the state should reasonably be expected to do for its citizens, and link it to 
notions of responsible citizen engagement.  
 
The Political Economy of Unproductive Entrepreneurship in Kuwait 
 
The legacy of four decades of rent redistribution has firmly embedded a notion of citizens’ 
entitlement among Kuwaiti nationals. The challenge facing Kuwaiti stakeholders is how to 
transform this into a productive culture of citizens’ engagement that can support the transition 
towards a knowledge economy.38 It is complicated by Kuwait’s demographic structure, in which an 
estimated 65 per cent of citizens are under the age of 25. Successive generations of Kuwaitis lack 
any point of comparison with the pre-oil era and regard the redistribution of wealth as a right, rather 
than a temporary privilege, of citizenship. This notion of the social contract based on unproductive 
rent-seeking behaviour is unsustainable.39  
 
A second manifestation of the political economy of rent redistribution is the sharp dichotomy 
between the public and private sectors and the emergence of dual labour markets. More than 90 
per cent of Kuwaiti citizens in the labour force are employed in the public sector, in sharp contrast 
to the private sector, which consists primarily of expatriate labourers, who also form 84 per cent of 
the total labour force.40 This is slowly changing, as there has been an increase in employment in 
the private sector in recent years and it is now the primary source of new jobs for Kuwaitis. 
Legislative reforms have encouraged this trend by subsidising private companies to enable them to 
match public sector salaries and benefits and encourage nationals to move over. Nevertheless, 
strategies of subsidisation are open to abuse and do not address head-on the high wage 
expectations of nationals. Directly or indirectly the public sector remains the “employer of last 
resort” that absorbs young Kuwaitis lacking the requisite skills and educational qualifications to 
compete for jobs in the private sector. Relations between the public and private sectors are marked 
by considerable tension and attitudes of mutual distrust that hinder efforts to create an enabling 
environment for transformative economic change.41  
 
Underlying and interlinking these problems is the poor state of education, in terms of qualitative 
improvement both in standards and in creating sufficient incentives for students to prioritise 
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academic achievement.42 This spills into attitudes towards work: the World Bank’s “State of Kuwait: 
Energising the Private Sector” survey found a strong duality in employer experiences with Kuwaiti 
and non-Kuwaiti workers. For instance, only 18.3 per cent of employers found non-Kuwaiti 
workers to exhibit indifference or an unfavourable work ethic, compared to 39.6 per cent for 
Kuwaitis. And whereas only 18.6 per cent of employers reported problems related to absenteeism 
and illness for non-Kuwaitis, the figure rose to 52.2 per cent for Kuwaitis. Not surprisingly, training 
provision is seen as an uphill battle that is largely not worth the costs. 
 
Kuwait nevertheless differs substantively from classical rentier assumptions of depoliticised 
societies. Its strong traditions of parliamentary government and participatory politics set Kuwait 
apart from the other GCC states (Bahrain, which is the closest parallel to Kuwait with a 
democratically elected lower house, still has an upper house made of royal appointees). This 
presents both a challenge and an opportunity for Kuwait to forge a distinct pathway of transition. 
The robust parliamentary system of checks and balances injects high levels of scrutiny and debate 
into the decision-making process in Kuwait. There is therefore little chance of Kuwait replicating the 
unsustainable “Dubai” model of development or taking ad hoc decisions that over-reach national 
capabilities. In addition, the need to secure political consensus imparts a degree of legitimacy and 
accountability to policymaking lacking in other GCC states, where decisions are more ad hoc and 
restricted to a small circle of officials.  
 
Set against the beneficial aspects of Kuwait’s participatory political system is the succession of 
political crises since 2006. During the three years to May 2009, the National Assembly was 
dissolved three times as the parliament and government repeatedly clashed. This necessitated 
fresh elections in 2008 and 2009 amid an atmosphere of instability. The political infighting caused 
the delay or cancellation of important structural reforms and of privatisation and development 
projects. These included a long-awaited law to create an independent regulatory agency in the 
financial sector, and the promotion of foreign investment and technology in the northern oilfields as 
part of Project Kuwait. Moreover, parliamentary opposition was instrumental in the cancellation of a 
$17.4-billion joint venture between Petrochemical Industries Company of Kuwait and the Dow 
Chemical Company, as well as a deal with a Japanese–South Korean consortium to construct a 
fourth oil refinery in Kuwait. Together, these decisions inflicted significant damage on Kuwait’s 
international reputation for ease of doing business, particularly as good governance indicators 
appear to have stalled over the past decade.43 
 
Internal tensions within Kuwait therefore account for much of the slow progress towards economic 
diversification in recent years. A number of reports, from the MIT study commissioned by the 
government in 1988 to the Blair Report, spanning more than 20 years have identified similar 
challenges and risks, but the gap between the recognition of the problem and the articulation of a 
feasible solution remains wide. The May 2009 election reflected popular frustration with the political 
elite and a desire for change that included the historic election of four women to the National 
Assembly.44 Improved relations between the new parliament and the government culminated in the 
approval of the Four Year Plan by the Assembly in February 2010. The near-unanimous support 
for the plan provides an opportunity for Kuwaiti policymakers to move ahead with its 
implementation in a consensual and effective manner. By taking measures to embrace the 
knowledge economy and reduce its dependence on volatile oil revenues, Kuwaitis can become the 
masters of their own destiny and shape a more sustainable economic future.  
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Economic Volatility  
 
The vulnerability of Kuwait’s economy can be seen in levels of economic volatility. To explore this 
issue, Koren and Tenreyro decompose volatility into three main components:45 the first captures 
the volatility of sectoral shocks – an economy that is concentrated in sectors such as oil that show 
high intrinsic volatility will tend to experience higher aggregate volatility; the second captures 
aggregate country-specific shocks – these are shared by all sectors in an economy, reflecting 
general conditions such as political and macroeconomic instability; the third captures the 
relationship or co-variance between sector-specific and country-specific shocks – for example, 
fiscal or monetary policy shocks in some countries might be associated with shocks to particular 
sectors, due for instance to inadequate countercyclical monetary or fiscal policy. 
 
Koren and Tenreyro then look at how volatility and its components have evolved in GCC countries 
from 1970 to 2006. During this period, compared to the global turmoil of the 1970s and in Kuwait’s 
case the troubles of the 1980s and early 1990s, aggregate volatility has abated significantly. 
Growth rates have also picked up: after two decades of negative growth, for instance, Kuwait 
experienced an average growth rate of 4.4 per cent in the 1990s and 4.5 per cent between 2000 
and 2006, the highest in the region. Part of this stability is attributable to the Great Moderation, with 
steady growth and low and stable inflation in most of the advanced economies spreading to the 
GCC, though this may have given way to hubris and a collective blind eye to other dangers such 
as asset bubbles that have subsequently materialised. But it also reflects a higher degree of 
sectoral diversification in most GCC economies, though this process is least advanced in Kuwait. 
Sectoral risk declines quite steeply with the level of development, indicating greater economic and 
technological diversification and the smaller intrinsic volatility of each sector. Notwithstanding some 
convergence since, all six GCC countries catch the eye as the biggest outliers, reflecting the 
towering influence of oil, with levels of risk highest in Kuwait. 
 
The limited diversification and development of the private non-oil sector can be further seen in 
calculations from the European Central Bank, describing the state of diversification in possible 
growth areas for GCC countries, namely commodities, manufacturing, finance and tourism.46 Again 
Kuwait seems less diversified than other GCC countries, though the financial sector has grown 
recently and is one in which Kuwaitis outnumber their expatriate counterparts. 
 
Comparative Advantages and Assets  
 
Notwithstanding this, Kuwait enjoys a number of strengths – some inherited, others instituted – that 
reduce the risk of crisis even if they do not completely ensure the success of a transition to a 
knowledge economy. The relevant items on this list of strengths include: 
  
 Plentiful resources of capital – the combination of Reserve Funds and private sector 
offshore investments exceeds $300 billion. though no official figures are available. A more 
modest, but still significant amount is held on shore. In tandem, they are taken be a key 
contributor to the ecosystem’s ability to mobilise resources, and the development of capital-
intensive industries.  
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 Abundant availability of petroleum – on the plausible assumption that the cost of energy 
to local industry is lower than for other locations, energy-intensive industries, from 
petrochemicals to aluminium and bioelectronics, should benefit. The Independent 
Petroleum Group, established in the 1970s to develop a downstream petrochemicals sector 
highlighted this potential; today, many of these sectors are dominated by regional players – 
for instance, Sabic and Qafco in chemicals and fertilisers.47 
 
 Sophisticated consumer base – with high disposable incomes, Kuwaitis are 
sophisticated, early adopters of new technology. Many innovations in online commerce are 
routinely piloted in Kuwait before being rolled out to other GCC countries.48 Demand for 
advanced products, such as “smart homes” as an estimated 275,000 new housing 
applications are made over the next 20 years, may provide a lead market for entrepreneurs. 
The willingness and ability of consumers to adopt new technologies are viewed by some as 
more important to a country’s prosperity than having a high share of R&D and are invoked 
to explain, amongst other things, US leadership in IT.49 
 
 Young population – Kuwait’s population, like that of the Arab world in general, is skewed 
towards young people. Whereas OECD countries will be confronting the seismic impact 
and spending needs of a rapidly ageing population, the proportion of working-age Kuwaitis 
is predicted to rise to 49 per cent of the population by 2030.50 Provided appropriate policy 
choices are made, this implies a larger number of “productive” members of the economy. 
Preferences for entrepreneurship are systematically found amongst younger people.51 
 
 Location – the country is at the heart of a substantial regional market, which includes 
major population centres of the GCC countries, southern Iraq, western Iran, northern Saudi 
Arabia and potentially a wider bridge to west, north and east Africa, eastern Europe and 
east Asia (the last already accounts for 75 per cent of Kuwaiti exports). Proximity to large 
markets could provide a very important strategic advantage in negotiating externally and 
attracting foreign business and technology to locate to Kuwait.52 
 
 Small country – Kuwait’s size may make various forms of networking easier while 
reducing principal–agent problems. Unlike larger and administratively more complex states, 
Kuwait has theoretically fewer veto points to sabotage or dilute the implementation of policy 
(although to reach consensus in the National Assembly on policy and law can take a 
significant amount of time, as the recently approved Privatisation Law shows).  
 
Significant if Scattered Initiatives to Improve the Ecosystem 
 
The government, moreover, has been taking steps to upgrade its S&T system. The 2007 Blue 
Ribbon Report, with its call for greater and more focused R&D spending under an STI Council as 
presented to us at the seminar, has provided significant impetus for these efforts, but they are long 
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overdue.53 KISR’s almost exclusive focus on research has enjoyed some notable successes, for 
instance in fishery and environmental management and the development of reverse osmosis 
technology; but this is also a source of the ecosystem’s greatest weaknesses. With management 
and business-development skills on the backburner, the system has difficulties in commercialising 
or sustaining initial success for the long term. 
 
This mismatch between invention and innovation capabilities is not unique to Kuwait, though the 
scale of upgrading necessary to bring Kuwait into line with not just high-income countries but also 
developing ones makes it more glaring. R&D expenditure per capita is only around $46 in Kuwait 
(under 0.2 per cent of GDP) compared to over $850 in high-income countries and $150 across the 
world. Institutions like KU and the KISR provide the central mass of scientific and technological 
talent, but this concentration arguably undercuts the ability of industry – notably the Kuwait 
Petroleum Company (KPC) – to engage with research institutions by limiting its absorptive 
capacity. Apart from KU, whose primary mission is teaching, KISR is the only institution with 
serious research capability. While its standing provides focus and leadership, the price has 
possibly been reduced institutional diversity. This lock-in is not lessened by participation in regional 
and international networks: from the hesitation or inability to compete for tenders in international 
markets such as National Institutes of Health (NIH) and National Science Foundation (NSF) 
programmes in the USA and Japan and the EU’s Framework Program 7 to the paucity of non-
Kuwaiti researchers and technicians in local institutions, there appears to be an implicit and subtle 
home bias. This raises the existential question of whether the system will have the capacity to 
translate any increase in R&D spending – say, to 1 or even 2 per cent of GDP – into enhanced 
competitiveness and performance. 
 
Recent efforts to reconfigure policy around innovation derived from and encouraging knowledge 
transfer and openness, and the enthusiasm of institutions such as KISR and the National Offset 
Company (NOC) in their endeavours, attest that the policy community recognises the scale of the 
challenge involved. The period has seen the establishment of the National Technology Enterprises 
Company (NTEC), the Kuwait Small Projects Development Company (KSPDC) and NOC with the 
purpose of adopting a more arm’s-length, private sector approach towards management of these 
issues.  
 
A central pillar of this strategy has been the overhaul of the FDI regime, whose restrictions and 
cumbersomeness compare unfavourably with the greater activism of GCC neighbours. In 2008, 
Kuwait had the dubious distinction of being the lowest recipient of FDI in the GCC, with inflows of 
only $58m. This contrasts with Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which received 
$1,794m, $2,928m, $6,700m, $38,223m and $13,700m in FDI respectively.54 Further measures 
such as permitting international arbitration, extending the lifespan of build–operate–transfers 
(BOTs), improving access to land and moving to one-stop shops may be necessary to encourage 
greater inflows of FDI where appropriate.  
  
Privatisation, as the main lightning rod for the standoff between government and parliament, has 
been slow and uneven. Efforts to energise the private sector have resulted in the enactment of Law 
7/2008 and the scheduled privatisation of Kuwait Airways (6/2008), while the entry of three 
domestic and two foreign providers in the telecommunications sector has increased contestability, 
though the sector continues to lack a regulator. It should be noted that Law 7/2008 is also referred 
to as the Public-Private-Partnership Law (PPP Law) and/or the BOT/PPP La). The privatisation law 
was approved by the National Assembly in May 2010. 
 
Finally, the government has signed a number of memoranda of understanding with Singapore, 
beginning in 2003, which have helped create a central platform of government IT reform, including 
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the establishment of the Central Agency of Information Technology (CAIT). But again there 
appears a gap between plans and deeds: the most recent Networked Readiness Index (NRI), 
compiled by the World Economic Forum and Insead, ranks Kuwait 76th of 133 countries, the 
lowest in its income class and a deterioration from previous years. Government appears to be the 
least ready and show the lowest interests towards ICT advances of all sectors, ranked 115th and 
81st for readiness and usage respectively.55 
  
These issues demand further systematic investigation, which is not possible within the scope of 
this discussion; however, a few tentative observations are possible. 
  
Lack of Coordination Impedes Efforts to Bring Initiatives Together 
 
Above all, many have expressed the concern that endeavours do not add up to a coherent whole. 
The hub-and-spoke structure of the Kuwaiti bureaucracy has created steep and segmented 
hierarchies, with departments and agencies eager to defend their turf in distributive and regulatory 
terms. There are few mechanisms for coordinating policy and its delivery, making it extremely 
difficult to manage cross-cutting issues. Cleavages are so pronounced that even institutions such 
as KISR and KU that are otherwise close kindred, located in the public sector and directed at 
academic missions, have had problems acting in unison.  
  
The experience of successful latecomers is illuminating. Taiwan and Singapore succeeded in large 
part because they were able to act in a coordinated manner with a strategic lead being provided by 
a lead agency – in Taiwan's case, the Council for Economic Planning and Development, and in 
Singapore's case, the Economic Development Board. These organisations are inevitably close to 
top officials and politicians. The Finnish Research and Innovation Council, which “addresses major 
issues relating to developments in science, technology and innovation policy and the human 
resources they entail, presenting the related proposals and plans to the Government”,56 is chaired 
by the prime minister and has as members five other cabinet ministers, including the Minister of 
Finance, as well as wide stakeholder representation from the directors general of the Academy of 
Finland, universities, industry and the labour unions. Finally, as some commentators have pointed 
out, agencies with broader, cross-sectoral jurisdictions typically enjoy greater autonomy and 
independence because legislative oversight is more difficult. 
 
Creating a knowledge economy requires self-conscious acts of coordination. For instance, an oft-
cited criticism of the public tendering process is that it is biased towards existing technological 
solutions perceived to be low risk and value for money rather than serving as a catalyst for the 
adoption of new technology. The constituents of the ecosystem are so interdependent that efforts 
to support one area, however well designed, are unlikely to materialise unless others are 
functioning adequately. Actors and institutions implanted in a business environment plagued by the 
burden of regulatory compliance, a lack of transparency, limited administrative efficiency, diluted 
implementation and pervasive elements of informality cannot avoid inheriting and reproducing 
these distortions in their behaviour. It can be seen in the preference of foreign companies for 
hands-off arrangements instead of equity investments or joint ventures when discharging their 
offset obligations; it can be seen in the NTEC’s shying away from early-stage technologies and 
transformation into conventional venture capital firms, and the limited demand for both short-term 
and long-term finance;57 it can be seen in the resilience of family-owned conglomerates that 
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internalise transaction costs when formal contracts and external funds are vulnerable to problems 
of weak governance but provide an unreliable and opaque basis upon which to operate on a larger 
scale and deal with strangers;58 and it can be seen in the ongoing utility of personal contacts 
(wasta) that help make responsive an otherwise indifferent and obstructive bureaucracy.  
 
Weaknesses in Governance and an Enabling Business Environment  
 
The World Bank Worldwide Governance indicators show that Kuwait’s position has stalled and 
even declined over the past decade, partly reflecting the fact that bureaucratic mechanisms can 
prove remarkably sticky once they are settled upon, whereas some GCC neighbours like Qatar 
have seen improvements in their capacity. 
 
This picture is also confirmed by the World Bank/IFC’s Doing Business 2010 report.59 Overall 
Kuwait ranked 61st out of 183 economies, though this hid the shrill fact that without impressive 
performance along a small number of dimensions – employing workers (24th), protecting investors 
(27th) and above all paying taxes (11th) – performance would have been substantially worse. 
Particular concerns arose in areas such as enforcing contracts (113th), starting a business (137th) 
and trading across borders (109th), not least because of Kuwait’s small-country status. The fact 
that Kuwait’s performance is so bifurcated with severe bottlenecks sitting alongside oases of good 
practice needs closer probing.  
 
Nonetheless the preconditions for successful regulatory reform go beyond the apparent scientific 
patina of indicators. On the one hand, regulatory reform is stillborn without adequate enforcement, 
but that enforcement requires incentivising low-level bureaucrats for whom minimal effort, 
bordering on inactivity, is the safest strategic option, since daring to put one’s head above the 
parapet and display any reformist initiative brings only greater risk and responsibility, often with 
little prospect of reward.60 On the other, an embedded culture of informality and arbitrariness, 
exemplified by the suspicion that institutions and processes are being designed in the interests of 
insiders, can erode trust and perceptions of regulatory fairness at a political level. Cross-national 
evidence suggests that low levels of trust go hand in hand with high levels of intervention as a 
means of coping with and compensating for lack of order. In a vicious cycle, the public favours 
state control over untrammelled activity by “unneighbourly” entrepreneurs, even when the public 
knows that government is corrupt and ineffective and that excessive regulation will have a chilling 
effect on entrepreneurship – and indeed that bureaucratic immobility will only generate further 
incentives to bend or circumvent the rules.61 
 
As intimated above, there are enclaves of professionalism within the Kuwaiti system, such as the 
Central Bank of Kuwait and KIA, that have enabled relatively swift and transparent administration, 
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even if some of the actual interventions and decisions are criticised.62 Administration is generally 
easier when policy issues can be decoupled and broken down into discrete projects. Again, further 
investigation is necessary to understand how these “islands of efficiency” emerge and operate in 
Kuwait and where possible to universalise their lessons.63 Significant resources permit not just the 
creation and funding of islands of bureaucratic efficiency but also the training and incentivisation of 
mid- and low-level bureaucrats, whose role tends to be underestimated in regulatory accounts but 
who are critical to the integrity of regulation.  
 
Finally, mindful that most reforms will touch raw distributional nerves, there is scope for building 
safeguards into processes such as privatisation and liberalisation. Other countries have innovated 
to get the necessary buy-in via giveaways and underpricing (which benefit citizens who apply to be 
shareholders); valuations (which benefit citizens and taxpayers); employee share-ownership 
schemes (which benefit workers); and to a lesser extent management buyouts (which benefit 
managers), forestalling the opposition that might otherwise block the creation of a more 
entrepreneurial culture.64 To reinforce the virtuous circle of confidence, these innovations should 
focus first on “easier” activities that do not entail substantial labour redundancies or adjustments in 
prices or tariffs and new investments in areas that would otherwise be reserved for the public 
sector – not least some of the projects outlined in the latest Four Year Plan, such as Harir City and 
production of electric power and water distillation plants. 
 
Weaknesses in the Education System and the Skills Base 
 
The other weak link is the state of the education system and human capital. However much 
government spends – and the Kuwaiti government allocates almost 13 per cent of its budget to 
education – the return on the investment has been disappointing. Although the system has seen 
improvements in enrolment, they are crude outputs not closely associated with quality. In the 
rankings of TIMMS 2007, Kuwait was placed near the bottom for mathematics with 354 points, and 
given 418 points for science, with no students reaching the advanced international benchmark. In 
the 2006 PIRLS rankings for reading, Kuwait finished third from bottom with 330 points, a 
considerable distance behind the top regional and global performers. A particular concern is that 
young men are not interested in education; they cavalierly expect a government job regardless of 
what or how much they learn. Women have a more certain work ethic but have been frozen out of 
the labour market for economic and socio-cultural reasons. Traditional pathways for new female 
workers such as light manufacturing have struggled to find space in an environment dominated by 
oil production.65  
 
Besides the perverse incentives of the social contract, the education system must cope with the 
strains of educating a young and expanding population – the old dictum that more means worse is 
an early storm warning to educators and policymakers. Teaching is considered a professional 
dead-end for top graduates, a stark contrast to the world’s most successful systems – Finland, 
South Korea and Singapore – which have attracted the best people to become teachers, 
developed them into effective teachers and intervened when students have fallen behind.66 Low 
entry requirements seal the profession’s Cinderella status: despite the fact that teachers’ salaries 
are generous in absolute terms, what arguably matters more is how well teaching pays relative to 
other occupations, and its opportunity costs in both monetary and non-monetary terms. At any rate 
                                               
62
 Interviews. 
63
 Hertog (2010) Princes, Brokers and Bureaucrats, p. 30. 
64
 Nemat Shafik (1996) “Selling Privatization Politically.” International Journal of the Economics of Business, 
3(3). 
65
 Michael Ross (2008) “Oil, Islam and Women,” American Political Science Review, 102(1). 
66
 Steven Rivkin, Eric Hanushek and John Kain (2005) “Teachers, Schools, and Academic Achievement.” 
Econometrica 73(2). See also McKinsey & Company (2008) How the World’s Best Performing Schools 
Come Out on Top. McKinsey. 
Kuwait and the Knowledge Economy  
A report prepared for KFAS 
 
© The Work Foundation. 36 
there is evidence that non-Kuwaiti teachers are poorly remunerated, and it did not go unnoticed in 
our interviews that the golden period of education, the 1960s, coincided with the substantial 
participation of Palestinian teachers in the Kuwaiti school system. There is also a concern that 
education strategies and curricula are not explicitly connected to economic goals or market needs, 
with muted collaboration between the business sector, labour departments and local community 
groups such as parent associations. In particular, a tradition of rote-learning and instruction has 
less and less purchase in a world where raw information is increasingly free and ubiquitous, yet the 
ability to synthesise, process and draw fruitful abstractions from it is in short supply; at other times, 
education has been used defensively to protect a fragile sense of identity that can take a highly 
dialectical form, setting those who embrace modernity against those who do not.67  
 
In this regard the growth of private and Western-style universities – the Australian College of 
Kuwait, the American University of Kuwait and the Gulf University of Science and Technology – is 
a promising institutional development. At present no more than 10 per cent of Kuwaiti citizens have 
obtained a university education, but some of these institutions offer a different educational model 
that emphasises instruction in English and the use of Western curricula, textbooks and academic 
requirements, often in partnership with foreign universities.68 It is too early to evaluate the success 
or sustainability of these new innovations: reported concerns about quality control may amount to 
nothing more than teething problems that will resolve themselves over time.69  
 
Nonetheless it is possible that the drive to expand higher education is confusing symptoms of 
underperformance with its underlying causes. A recent finding of what might be loosely called the 
neuroscientific revolution – the growth of scientific understanding of the brain and mind – has been 
the renewed attention to the early and adolescent years. Nobel Prize-winner James Heckman 
likens the learning process to scaffolding: all cognitive, social and emotional competencies are built 
on a foundation of competencies that are developed earlier, implying that their early mastery 
makes learning at later ages easier, more motivating and more likely to continue.70 One estimate 
suggests that 50 per cent of the variance in inequality in lifetime earnings is determined by age 
18.71 Hence by the time a student reaches university, the scope for enhancing skills may be 
limited. Building a workforce prepared for the knowledge economy requires sensitivity to the 
underlying technology of skills formation – the fact that certain periods are more optimal for 
learning certain skills than others. It also requires that learning is carefully integrated with its 
motivational and emotional aspects: education must be something that pulls people in – the 
Science Club that engages students with an interest in S&T may be a serviceable precedent for 
imagining other ways in which motivation can be fostered for productive activity.72 
 
Above all, a tighter and more obvious link between effort, aspiration and achievement is required. 
Schools and colleges can begin this process by rewarding desirable behaviour not just at the top 
but at all levels – for instance, by fixing the level of starting salaries for public sector jobs to high 
school grades or providing a citizens’ grant for reaching particular educational milestones. 
Introducing some form of selection and excellence to the education system along the lines of the 
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British grammar school or the German gymnasium is another option. One virtue of low-income 
inequality, in Kuwait and elsewhere, is the freedom of manoeuvre it affords educators to improve 
welfare, especially as there is evidence that high-ability students benefit more from having higher-
achieving schoolmates and less variation in peer quality than students of lower ability.73 Insofar as 
the experiences and opportunities of children are broadly similar in equal societies, it is possible to 
distinguish abilities without violating principles of fairness. By contrast, in societies where the 
imprint of family investment and differential access to opportunities patterns life-chances, selection 
can harm not only efficiency but also equity by perpetuating the accidents of birth. 
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Section 5 
Common Strategies for Upgrading 
How latecomers compete in global markets at a stage in their development where they have basic 
industrial structures in place but are neither technological leaders with inimitable knowledge assets 
nor still benefit from low, unskilled wages shines light on the strategic options available to Kuwait. 
The first observation is that high-tech industries in emerging economies import many important 
peripherals, parts and components. Imports play a much greater role than they do in advanced 
economies, even in import-intensive industries such as electronics.74 Similarly, internationalisation 
is a much greater imperative for latecomers. It reflects not the normal cycle of growth and 
expansion whereby firms project initial advantages outwards but a vital springboard for obtaining 
totally new advantages.75 The case for export promotion agencies charged with gathering foreign 
market information on consumer preferences, business opportunities, quality and technical 
requirements is much stronger in this respect.76 Very few Kuwait firms seem to have this capability.  
 
These mechanisms are allowing latecomers to push into new areas of economic areas, some of 
which are knowledge intensive on any account. While the heterogeneity of country endowments 
and circumstances and the pace of change in the global economy make generalisations difficult, it 
is possible to identify to a number of generic strategies that are being pursued by latecomer firms. 
In recent work, Ramamurti and Singh of Northeastern University and the Wharton School show 
how each leverages advantages that are specific and often unavailable to more advanced 
countries and firms.77 Strategies include: 
 
 Natural resource vertical integrator: this strategy is available only to countries endowed 
with natural resources in which firms engage in cross-border forward integration to secure 
downstream markets. Contrary to the logic of vertical disintegration in many industries, a 
premium is placed on the integration of all segments of the value chain from resource 
extraction right down to processing, petrochemicals, distribution and marketing. Examples 
include Saudi Aramco of Saudi Arabia, Gazprom, Lukoil and Norilsk of Russia, or Vale of 
Brazil. 
 
 Local optimiser: this strategy turns on adapting products and production processes to the 
distinctive tastes and conditions of local markets, often supplying consumers in countries 
with underdeveloped “hard” and “soft” infrastructures. Examples include Haier’s washing 
machines that are not only smaller and better suited to small loads but can be used to wash 
vegetables, or Tata Group’s trucks that are famous for their ruggedness in demanding 
climates and ease of maintenance without need for elaborate after-sales care. Adversity is 
occasionally turned into a competitive advantage: Zain’s growth has been facilitated by the 
reluctance of Western executives to enter markets littered with institutional voids and alien 
to their own; similarly Fasttelco has launched WiMax broadband technology to bridge the 
connectivity gaps in areas that lack physical infrastructure for broadband services. 
 
                                               
74
 Richard Langlois (1992) “External Economies and Economic Progress: The Case of the Microcomputer 
Industry.” Business History Review, 66(1). 
75
 Yadong Luo and Rosalie L Tung (2007) “International Expansion of Emerging Market Enterprises: A 
Springboard Perspective.” Journal of International Business Studies, 38. 
76
 Daniel Lederman, Marcelo Olarreaga and Lucy Payton (2009) “Export Promotion Agencies Revisited.” 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5125. The World Bank’s “State of Kuwait: Energising the Private 
Sector” report found that only 14.9 per cent of exporting firms had surveyed foreign markets and 46 per cent 
had a formal marketing function. 
77
 This section draws heavily on Ravi Ramamurti and Jitendra Singh’s excellent (2009) Emerging 
Multinationals in Emerging Economy. Cambridge University Press. 
Kuwait and the Knowledge Economy  
A report prepared for KFAS 
 
© The Work Foundation. 39 
 Low-cost partner: this strategy exploits the low wages of emerging markets to gain a place 
as supplier-partners in high-wage companies. The arbitrage strategy works less powerfully 
for high-income emerging economies, though firms from these countries may, in turn, 
outsource work or import low-wage, skilled and unskilled workers with the hope that 
maintaining a presence close to customers in developed countries will secure more value-
added activity. Examples include Wipro, Infosys, TCS, Dr. Reddy’s, WEG and Sabo. 
 
 Global consolidator: this strategy aims to build global or regional scale in relatively mid-
tech industries such as cement, steel, aluminium, auto parts, personal computers and 
beverages. Firms exploit late-mover advantages by utilising plants with the newest 
technology or largest scale available, contrasting with Western incumbents, and are less 
burdened by uncompetitive labour contracts. Access to cheap credit allows some to make 
upmarket acquisitions of underperformers in advanced countries. Examples include Tata 
Steel, Hindalco, South African Breweries, Lenovo, Wanxiang and Cemex. 
 
 Global first mover: this strategy seeks to leap to the global technological frontier rather 
than come up the ranks as a second mover in a mature industry. It requires a strong 
innovation ecosystem but makes eclectic use of external knowledge. Many latecomer 
global first movers have come from Israel – compelling proof that small states can develop 
pioneering technologies. However, Israel’s model of development has left it deeply 
vulnerable; in particular, its single-minded focus on securing advantages on the basis of 
advanced R&D has constrained its ability to achieve sustained growth. Examples include 
Check Point, Teva and Embraer. 
 
Our preliminary interviews confirm that the most successful Kuwaiti firms have been operating as 
natural resource vertical integrators or local optimisers. A problem has been scale. As Kuwait’s 
own experience with cooperatives demonstrates, small firms are not often particularly innovative or 
dynamic – closer to the antiquated mom-and-pop store than the paradigmatic swashbuckling start-
up.  
 
Size matters because it allows firms to exploit scale economies to compensate for lack of cutting-
edge technology or to diversify out of declining sectors. It also matters because first movers in 
advanced countries will use size to single out potential partners in order to reduce their own risk 
and monitoring costs. Similarly with regard to foreign vendors, bigger buyers are more likely to 
receive greater technical assistance and other information.78 An emphasis on rapid upgrading 
explains the emergence of distinctive forms of networking, such as centre–satellite factory systems 
in Taiwan that aim to strengthen small firms by bringing them into the loop of a large enterprise, 
with appropriate inducements for both sides. It explains the relaxation of rules on domestic M&As 
and the popularity of outward FDI: cross-border M&As by firms in latecomer economies ballooned 
almost 250-fold between 1987 and 2006, from $400 million (less than 1 per cent of global M&A 
transactions in 1987) to $100 billion (almost 9 per cent of global M&A transactions in 2006). 
Acquisitions of brands or marketing or distribution networks, as manifestations of intangibles, are 
increasing in popularity.79 In Kuwait's case horizontal and vertical expansion is particularly 
obstructed by land unavailability and to a lesser extent by the absence of capital financing and 
inadequate feasibility studies. 
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“Going It Alone” Is Not an Option: Knowledge Transfer and Openness 
 
The appeal of acquisitions underscores another feature of successful latecomers: firms are 
prospecting and harnessing global networks of knowledge rather than wasting resources in futile 
efforts to ape the grand scientific and industrial establishments of the twentieth century.80 Consider 
the success of the Brazilian aerospace company Embraer: as the world’s third or fourth largest 
aircraft maker and the leader in regional jets, it has reached the aviation industry’s technological 
frontier, the exception not the rule for latecomers. Established in 1969 for military purposes, it was 
originally a state-owned enterprise, sponsored by the Aeronautics Ministry. Embraer has grown 
alongside a regional cluster of supplying firms and technical institutes but with it coordinating the 
supply chain for components. For all intents and purposes, it is a microcosm of a standard, self-
standing innovation system. 
 
Crucial to Embraer’s expansion, however, has been its willingness to bypass local firms and 
institutions. Beginning with its alliance with Piper (USA) in the late 1970s, Embraer has been 
ruthlessly pragmatic. Today it buys over 95 per cent of the components from the international 
aerospace market and only shops domestically for low-tech components. Local value-added 
amounts to only 38 per cent of turnover. When Embraer was faced with skill shortages in the local 
aerospace research institute in the early 1990s, it had no reservations about setting up an 
engineering office in the USA. Embraer was consequently privatised in 1994, with major French 
aerospace companies taking a 20 per cent equity stake in the company in return for access to 
advanced technologies. Embraer is a national company innovating in its own right but borrows 
liberally from an international production system and numerous ecosystems populating it.81 
 
None of this is easy. The vast amount of knowledge around the world is growing ever vaster and 
ever more rapidly and requires strong horizon-scanning capabilities. Knowledge is not explicit, and 
is hard to decouple from where geographically it was generated. To understand the options 
requires the capacity to immerse key decision makers in the knowledge flows – and to have some 
control over their creation. All requires a big investment in the local knowledge ecosystem to create 
the ability to link to the global system.  
 
Some countries have made a virtue of judicious disregard of some standard growth-promoting 
prescriptions just as others strayed by scrupulous regard for them.82 Even a backstop like FDI can 
sometimes hurt a latecomer’s innovation ecosystem more than it helps. Firms may invest in 
upgrading local capabilities, but only if experienced labour is available: not surprisingly, the most 
popular venues for US outward FDI in R&D remain Canada and Europe, and vice versa.83 Even 
then, investing in such capabilities is hazardous due to labour poaching, and may not be carried 
out by a private firm, especially a foreign one with high opportunity costs in the form of trained 
researchers at home. It is more rational to keep the corporate crown jewels under the territorial 
control of top management and scientists far away from prying eyes. Where FDI takes the form of 
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entirely foreign-owned firms run in export enclaves, it may crowd out the development of local 
capabilities, as the goal is to take advantage of lower wages.84 Ireland’s industrial record –buoyant 
job creation offset by weak indigenous innovation – testifies to the acute trade-offs and risks 
inherent in this approach.85  
 
Joint ventures, by contrast, have proved a more effective form of FDI, though the temptation to use 
them to strong-arm knowledge transfer is often difficult to resist. Japanese joint ventures were the 
cornerstone of Taiwan’s phenomenal upgrading in electronics. Local content requirements, 
meanwhile, encouraged the transfer of know-how not only to joint-venture partners but also to local 
parts suppliers, providing local firms with opportunities to get closer to the frontier without fear of 
being crushed or marginalised. Given the requirement to buy locally, the Japanese had an interest 
in suppliers being as efficient as possible. Israel’s Bi-national Industrial Research and 
Development foundation (BIRD) provides another illustration of the hands-on strengths of joint 
ventures.86 By financing as much as 50 per cent of a project in which one Israeli and one US firm 
agree to develop a joint product and split the revenues, BIRD offers a low-risk model for 
collaboration. Part of its success comes from the division of labour between Israeli and US firms: 
the former focuses on R&D and the latter on marketing and product distribution. To this end, BIRD 
trains Israeli firms in how to work and collaborate with US firms and provides a matching service, 
with a database, compiled by visiting thousands of US firms, containing information on potential 
partners and their technological areas of interest. 
 
The Power of Human Capital Flows 
 
The diaspora and return migrants have proved an extremely important channel of knowledge 
transfer. In particular, they have absorbed the more tacit and serendipitous aspects of knowledge 
by literally living and breathing it through experience and practice in the context where it resides. 
One of the first actions many successful latecomers have taken is to send the home population to 
advanced countries for training, education and employment – for instance, the number of 
undergraduates applying to UK universities from GCC countries alone doubled between 2006 and 
2009.87 Along with their familiarity with local circumstances and their credibility among local actors, 
return migrants and the diaspora can become “Archimedean levers” for change. The danger is that 
individuals educated or employed abroad do not return home, resulting in a permanent brain drain: 
emigration rates of highly educated individuals can exceed 60 per cent in some small countries, 
and since 1990, the highly educated diaspora of developing countries has doubled in size.88 The 
scale of the problem varies with the opportunity costs: the likelihood that a student will remain in 
the host country after graduation falls as average per capita income in the home country increases, 
a finding which has somewhat benign implications for a country as wealthy as Kuwait. A strong 
sense of citizenship and attachment to the country also help stem the haemorrhaging of domestic 
talent.89 The “reverse brain drain” from OECD economies as scientists, doctors and engineers 
return to their non-OECD homelands to take advantage of new opportunities is of growing 
importance. 
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The emergence of a global market for skilled professionals has added a new dimension to these 
discussions as countries increasingly compete to attract and retain foreign talent. In US 
universities, foreign-born academics constitute more than 25 per cent of the tenure track faculty, 
make up approximately 60 per cent of the postdoctoral population, and represent more than 43 per 
cent of the doctoral degrees awarded in science and engineering. The numbers are even more 
impressive when one considers the disproportionate contribution of foreign-born researchers to 
productivity in the university and the wider economy: for instance, 44 per cent of the first authors of 
US papers in the leading journal Science are foreign, while they make up one third of the 
placements of new PhDs with US firms.90 Policy needs to be more closely attuned to the motivation 
of these individuals and the lifecycle of their careers. Pay matters but as “pilgrims”, in the OECD’s 
typology, they are motivated by a fuzzier, less tractable stew of incentives: autonomy and creative 
control, dense peer networks and a physically and culturally conducive environment in which to 
gather and share ideas.91  
 
No Knowledge Transfer without Absorptive Capacity 
 
As we showed in section 1, the ability to master particular technologies associated with the 
knowledge economy over the past decade is likely to vary from region to region within the world 
economy. How far knowledge flows are converted into technological outputs depends on the 
quality of human capital, access to finance and the business and macroeconomic environment. 
One regional study finds that FDI, over and above its contribution to capital formation, generated 
no technological spillovers for Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia during the 
period 1980–99.92 The main reason is that none of these countries possessed the requisite 
capacity to absorb and make use of incoming knowledge. Under these circumstances, the use of 
fiscal concessions, especially broad-based instruments such as tax holidays, can quickly become a 
costly and ineffective drag on a tight public purse. 
 
The Dangers of Overreliance on External Relations  
 
Obtaining external knowledge requires a degree of commitment and investment in order to be 
successful. Where third parties are also learning and benefiting from the relationship, they will have 
an incentive to contribute to it as vigorously as possible: but where relations are approached 
passively, there will be an increased risk of third-party dependence and drift. Trophy alliances may 
give latecomers the vicarious confidence that learning is taking place; but it is a false sense of 
security that can blind them to the need for firsthand learning and the paucity of what in fact they 
are receiving. In a study of international alliances, McKinsey found that two thirds of alliances 
between equally matched partners were successful, but where there was a significant imbalance of 
power almost 60 per cent of alliances failed.93 This raises the paradox that interests might be 
served better through alliances that are grounded in equality of resources and capabilities, even 
though they are not a first-best solution. In other words, think Boston University; not necessarily 
Harvard. 
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Section 6 
Strategic Options 
 
Kuwait is a small economy that is a latecomer to constructing a knowledge economy – with all that 
implies. However, the country has significant assets along with institutions and initiatives on which 
to build. For example, the current Four Year Plan, agreed by parliament, the executive and the 
emir, is an important advance. But it is also clear that the wider enabling environment in which a 
knowledge economy flourishes requires major and longer-term reform. We were impressed during 
our visit by the widespread awareness that much of Kuwait’s soft infrastructure, from education to 
the systems of governance and accountability within both the public and private sector, needs 
reform. A number of our interviewees and those at the half-day seminar went further, pointing to 
the entitlement culture that disables the entrepreneurialism which is the precondition for a 
successful knowledge economy. However, addressing and reforming this enabling environment 
constitute a major political and cultural challenge. 
 
We have organised our proposals into three categories that are tiered in difficulty. There is an array 
of immediate win/win initiatives and policy interventions, along with closer analysis of the real 
business models that Kuwait companies can create, which offer a short-term programme of 
feasible action. They involve a range of relatively autonomous interventions, some within the Four 
Year Plan, which do not seriously disturb the existing distribution of economic rent while creating 
some foundations for knowledge economy development. That is what both makes them and limits 
the pay-offs. In general, Kuwait’s capacity to move faster will depend on joint-venture and general 
openness for business and ideas; the greater its own absorptive capacity the more it will benefit 
and the larger the pay-offs – which is why the strategy has to be conceived as cumulative and 
interdependent. There is more institution building to support the innovation ecosystem and soft 
infrastructure – and then there is changing the wider enabling culture. Kuwait will need to take a 
careful, well-thought-through, step-by-step approach to improving the wider enabling environment 
if it wants to reap the full economic and social rewards of a knowledge economy, each step 
cumulatively strengthening its innovation ecosystem, the vibrancy of its emergent private business 
sector and its wider absorptive capacity. It is, after all, whole societies and economies that 
innovate. This is the challenge – but we are under no illusion about how hard it will be to execute 
and deliver.  
  
Better Marshalling of Pre-Existing Initiatives and Institutions 
 
The first target is to build up the existing components of Kuwait’s innovation ecosystem, as far as 
possible closing the gaps and making the whole system cohere better. In addition Kuwait must 
proactively look for opportunities to create viable business models and joint ventures in areas 
where the country has obvious comparative advantage, notably oil, solar energy, water and marine 
technologies, smart infrastructure – given the scale and ambition of construction – and meeting the 
demands of rich consumers. The most viable business models initially are likely to be those that 
are local optimisers and natural resource vertical integrators, but there is no reason why Kuwait 
could not emulate the success of countries like Taiwan and Brazil and develop global 
consolidators. Privatisation, joint ventures and spin-outs from existing state-owned enterprises are 
strategies that other small latecomers have adopted, and Kuwait is unlikely to be an exception – 
while simultaneously incubating small high-tech firms and start-ups. Our suspicion is that the 
prospects for finance over the next five to ten years are likely to be more constrained in the wake 
of the credit crunch and that it will be hard to overtake centres in the region that have first-mover 
advantage, especially as education and skills development systems do not meet the requirements 
of dynamic economies today. However, Kuwait has a strong banking sector that will grow and 
requires support; but hopes for growth need to be realistically anchored. Economic diversification 
will lie with other sectors.  
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More attention needs to be paid to developing the capacity and capabilities in intangibles expecting 
to develop manu-service companies, although we were unable in the span of our short visit to 
identify particular candidates or sectors in which candidates might be groomed, or to assess 
whether there is sufficiently strong “soft” infrastructure to help manu-service companies develop. 
Nor have we had the capacity to inspect, assess and audit the Four Year Plan to offer detailed 
suggestions as to what elements potentially conform with a knowledge-economy strategy. 
However, we believe that there are elements within it that should be grouped and classified as 
Kuwait’s knowledge-economy strategy. Here are some first thoughts. 
 
a) Potential Short-Term Innovation Ecosystem Actions 
 
Public research and technology transfer 
 
 KISR’s transformation plan, to become a centre of excellence focusing on key sectors 
(petroleum, water, energy and building, environment and life science) and aiming 
imaginatively to embed commercialisation of ideas, is strategically right and has wide 
support within Kuwait. However, ambition needs to be tempered with realism; it is hard for a 
small latecomer state to build up excellent research competence.  
 Government and state-owned enterprise procurement policy needs to support business 
incubation at KISR, KU and other small and medium-sized companies, and then to privilege 
them with orders.  
 There needs to be further investment in KU’s research capability and its own linkages with 
the business community, in particular in intangibles – design, non-scientific R&D, 
advertising and brand equity, and management and leadership. We were not able to visit 
the university and were unable to form a judgement about its strategy and to what degree, if 
at all, it might be modified to support the knowledge economy. However, it is certain to have 
a key role. 
 The Canadian Research Chair (CRC) model to attract talented overseas researchers 
should be looked at. It combines generous monetary awards with assurances that 
researchers can devote a portion of time to their own intellectual interests. For instance, the 
CRC provides world leaders in their disciplines with an annual award of $170,000 for 7 
years’ duration (renewable indefinitely); in addition, it provides exceptional young faculty 
with an annual award of $85,000 for 5 years’ duration (renewable just once). 
 
Market development and firm creation 
 
 Audit all state-owned enterprises for potential self-standing business spin-offs and 
privatisation options. This is where a cohort of local optimisers and natural resource vertical 
integrators are most likely to be found quickly, and these can be grown and supported. 
 Work within the GCC to create GCC common standards. 
 Set up a new or reformed export promotion agency to support firm internationalisation 
efforts.  
 Create emir’s prizes for research breakthroughs and business excellence, open to 
international participation. We would like to explore this recommendation more fully in a 
second phase of work, but the design criteria are critical to the success of the idea. The 
prizes need to be carefully calibrated to encourage sectors and enterprises that correspond 
with the plans, and it is vital to have a transparent process for determining the winner to 
avoid charges of favouritism. There also needs to be a strategy for publicising and 
celebrating winners; 
 Extend the Science Clubs to entrepreneurship clubs. Get school children to develop a taste 
for the private sector, its challenges and rewards, through internships and mentoring. 
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Finance  
 
 There is growth in sharia retail banking, and there are opportunities for developing sharia-
compliant venture capital, start-up and business development. This should be explored and 
piloted.  
  
Education and skills 
 
 The Four Year Plan seeks to lift educational attainment. Preconditions for this are an 
immediate improvement in the incentives for males to enter teaching rather than other 
occupations, and narrowing the pay gap between Kuwaiti and non-Kuwaiti teachers (with 
the latter being relatively underpaid). Quickly implementable, this could have an impact 
within a relatively short period. 
 There is a need to step up the programme of Kuwait undergraduates studying overseas. 
 University and training courses should be audited for relevance, with a view to phasing out 
those with uncertain value.  
 The programmes and links with overseas universities need to be organised as strategically 
as possible. There are obvious and important arguments for links with centres of 
excellence, but Kuwait should also build up its linkages with Western and Asian academic 
institutions where there is more equivalence of capabilities; austerity programmes and cuts 
to university budgets in many OECD countries make the moment ripe for such 
collaborations.  
 KPC should consider creating a corporate university to train individuals and help 
organisational learning as its contribution to the innovation ecosystem. We would need to 
carry out a full audit and assessment to establish the business case. 
 Kuwait apprentice schemes that focus on the key growth sectors should be developed.  
 
Openness and improved governance  
 
 Kuwait needs an even stronger institutional capacity to assess, attract and network inward 
flows of knowledge. KISR and KFAS are the two principal institutions to do such work and 
one needs to assume lead responsibility, albeit with active input and participation from 
other institutions, including KU, the Public Authority for Applied Education and Training 
(PAAET), private universities, the Kuwait Foreign Investment Bureau (KFIB), NTEC, NOC, 
CAIT and the Science Club, among others. KISR, KFAS or both need to expand overseas 
operations as knowledge scouts, working alongside whatever export-promotion capacity 
Kuwait has developed or intends to develop in key growing markets like India. 
 This implies a thought-through strategy on identifying priority countries with which to form 
alliances and joint ventures – a partnership with Malaysia to introduce sharia-compliant 
finance to the GCC? With India for exports? With India or Britain for inward investment? 
This recommendation will require further research and exploration.  
 
b) Medium-Term Options 
 
The following ideas and recommendations need further testing and shaping, and are only some of 
the potential initiatives, but we suggest them as examples of ways of following through on the more 
immediate actions. 
 
Public research and technology transfer 
  
 Ensure collaboration across ministries and policy coherence by establishing cross-cutting 
KPIs, cross-cutting budgetary arrangements and a dedicated government body for the 
knowledge economy and innovation. To reduce the transaction costs of collaboration, 
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government should increase standardisation of information and HR systems. 
 
Market development and firm creation  
 
 Create a fast-track process for joint ventures. 
 Promote intangibles – creative and cultural industries, in particular design, advertising and 
architecture; management and leadership; ICT and software skills – and raise R&D levels. 
 Overhaul and reform public procurement to stimulate innovation. In our short visit we were 
unable to come to a view, but in general we noticed a low level of trust of public 
procurement by business, only moderate professionalism and little understanding of its 
potential strategic importance. But from intangibles to firm growth, public procurement is a 
powerful strategic tool, especially in areas that will see considerable government 
investment in coming years, such as health and housing. 
 
Finance  
 
 Promote share ownership and create other incentives to garner and sustain support for 
privatisation (now enacted by Law 37 of 2010). 
 Emulate the BIRD foundation as a model for establishing joint ventures and providing 
finance for start-ups. For instance, Kuwait might piggy-back off the strength of Indian 
entrepreneurs and a large market to help market and commercialise unexploited areas of 
research, say in environmental management.  
 
Education and skills  
 
 Follow through on the educational reforms in Phase One. In particular, boys’ staying-on 
rate needs to be improved. Offer bonuses for attending and completing secondary school. 
 Encourage deeper links between the universities and schools. 
 Phase out degrees and diplomas that do not prepare Kuwaitis for the knowledge economy.  
 
Openness and governance  
 
 Encourage more professionalism in the public bureaucracy. There needs to be more 
transparency about how decisions are arrived at. Introduce better training of lower- and 
medium-level officials, with bonuses and rewards for enforcing regulation or meeting 
targets. Kuwait might create “one-stop” shops to help business start-ups and compliance 
with regulation and official procedures. Learn from the operation of existing centres of 
official excellence. 
 Give legal protection for whistleblowers. 
 Follow through the Blair Report recommendations to improve the capability of the prime 
minister’s office. 
 
A New Social Contract for Kuwait 
 
An effective innovation ecosystem requires a different kind of social contact – one where the bias 
is towards rewarding effort and engagement and moving away from simple entitlements. Here is a 
suite of possible longer-term initiatives. 
 
 Move towards creating centres of academic excellence in the public sector, borrowing from 
private schools, as the next phase of educational reform. Pilot grammar schools based on 
selection.  
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 Consider, as one incentive, making public sector starting salaries conditional on years of 
attendance at school, building on bonuses. 
 Create a Kuwaiti “Permanent Fund”, modelled on the Alaska Permanent Fund, that offers 
current citizens additional support to acquire assets that are earned by merit or examination 
– for instance, for students who complete school and/or university or study subjects that are 
particularly demanded by the knowledge economy. 
 Move towards an asset-based welfare system in which, above a certain minimum, income 
and assets can be earned. Create baby bonds.  
 Phase in civil service exams to complete the programme of professionalisation. 
 Strengthen the accountability of government to parliament. 
 Begin to move towards equivalent wages and conditions in public and private sectors. 
 Move toward better systems of corporate governance and accountability for firms. Stock 
market listing must imply systematic and accurately audited financial statements. 
 
Conclusion  
 
This is an interim report pointing the way to a more diversified knowledge economy that builds on 
Kuwait’s comparative advantages by creating an innovation ecosystem. To complete our work we 
need to: 
 
 Analyse closely the Four Year Development Plan to foreground and integrate knowledge-
economy strategy initiatives in order to establish any quick wins. 
 Follow up areas where our analysis was necessarily incomplete, such as KPC and a 
corporate university.  
 Do a proper market analysis of sectors and industries in which Kuwait might have a 
competitive advantage. What are the prospects/scenarios for these sectors/industries? 
What skills and support are they likely to require? 
 Map/scan what others are doing in terms of research and knowledge creation, especially in 
areas that are important to Kuwait. This will allow us to identify opportunities for 
international cooperation and collaboration with different research centres, and fruitful 
research directions.  
 Do a comprehensive gap analysis of each of the conditions that constitute an innovation 
ecosystem. For example, in the public research component, where does Kuwait enjoy a 
comparative advantage? How broad or narrow is the knowledge base? To what extent 
does the knowledge base cover the whole value chain?  
 Develop a series of KPIs by which progress can be measured, drawing on efforts that 
evaluate innovation in wider systemic and institutional terms.94 
 Detail local optimiser and natural resource vertical integration business models so that all 
those who need to understand them can do so. Examine any areas in which there might be 
opportunities for a global consolidator strategy. How can Kuwaiti firms avoid the pitfalls 
associated with M&As as they seek to scale up? 
 Map Kuwait’s current stock of firms operating in intangibles, and open up discussion about 
the manu-service business model. 
 Examine how the take-up of financial flows to enterprise can be improved. 
 Offer suggestions for creation of Kuwaiti selective secondary schools and other educational 
reforms.  
 Scope the possibility of creating a new citizen grant or baby bond. 
 Scope emir’s prizes. 
 Offer a view on sharia-compliant venture capital and finance. 
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To this end, we will draw on our existing networks and consult international experts in reference 
countries and sectors. However, this process will not be possible without dedicated support in 
Kuwait. As part of any next phase of work, we will need to work closely with the LTE to assemble a 
group of local researchers – economists, statisticians and social scientists – who will help us 
determine what data exists, collect new data and mount new research. The mapping of the micro-
foundations for good policy is an enormous task. We will also deepen our relationships with local 
companies and organisations, so that analyses and recommendations are truly iterative and have 
the greatest possible reach, familiarity and credibility.  
 
Although after our visit to Kuwait we are more aware of the challenges, we are also more aware of 
the opportunities. This is the trajectory on which we believe Kuwait must travel . The second leg of 
the report will offer a more detailed blueprint. 
 
Ian Brinkley, Kristian Coates-Ulrichsen, Will Hutton and Philippe Schneider 
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Appendix A: Summary of the Kuwait and the Knowledge Economy Seminar, KFAS, 15 March 2010  
 
Questions/comments after Will’s presentation  
 
Dr Adnan Al-Sultan opened the discussion following Will Hutton’s presentation by asking who has 
been in charge of executing the various strategies thus far. He stated that there is no one unit in 
charge in Kuwait and that stakeholders are fragmented on multiple levels.  
 
Dr Mahdy Al-Jazzaf stated that many entities within the Executive Branch of the Kuwaiti 
government need to work together to achieve the transition towards a knowledge based economy. 
A science, technology and innovation (STI) council had been proposed to ensure that KU, KISR 
and KFAS coordinate their work. Dr Al-Jazzaf described the Four Year Plan as ambitious and 
asked if it will achieve a knowledge-economy transition, and, if not, how it may be modified to go in 
this direction. He added that Kuwait is not a meritocratic system, and that in order for the 
knowledge economy to take root the economic environment must be an incubator for such skills to 
rise to the top and allow the entrepreneurial element to flourish.  
 
Dr Naji Al-Mutairi stated that the Kuwaiti dilemma was a question of ascertaining who leads what 
and in which direction the country should go. He also questioned the relative importance of the role 
of project managers, as opposed to entrepreneurs.  
 
Second session  
 
Dr Yousef Al-Ebraheem, Amiri Diwan, opened the second session by stating that Kuwait does 
not have an explicit STI policy as there are currently no guidelines for coordination. There have 
been uncoordinated attempts in different institutions across both the public and the private sectors.  
 
Dr Al-Ebraheem outlined a number of relevant initiatives that the Kuwaiti government has been 
working on:  
a) An e-government project that is about 10 years old has developed strategy in coordination 
and cooperation with the Singaporean government. Its objective is to create a competitive 
environment among government agencies. Some are now far head others, with the Ministry 
of Interior doing particularly well. However, the programme now has more than one leader 
and institution – the Council of Ministers as well as the Civil Service Commission.  
b) Education policy aims to make Kuwait a regional centre for education and the development 
of (non-profit) software, using multimedia, CDs and the internet. This aims to improve the 
quality of education in schools and is focused on science and ICTs. 
c) The business sector: government institutions, led by KIA, have played a role by establishing 
two companies – NTEC and KSPDC – to promote technology transfer to small businesses 
and the private sector, focusing on waste management and the environment.  
d) The private sector: three telecommunications companies have been created – two foreign 
companies and Zain. However, Kuwait lacks a regulatory agency to monitor and regulate 
the sector.  
e) The health sector: the Dasman Diabetics Centre is a centre of excellence promoting R&D 
and technology transfer.  
f) The offset programme uses the transfer of technology as the main component of 
multipliers.  
g) The Foreign Direct Investment Office aims to attract inward investment and the transfer of 
technology to Kuwait.  
 
Nevertheless, there is no coordinated effort to bring all of these sectors together. Kuwait needs to 
focus on addressing the broader issues of job creation, reducing dependence on foreign labour, 
and the improvement of government services.  
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Kuwait also faces a number of problems. These include bureaucratic delays and abundance of red 
tape; lack of a coordinated vision and follow-up policy; frequent change of ministers and service 
leaders; a weak and outdated legal structure; a perception that spending on IT is a luxury item; and 
low R&D expenditure. In addition, there is insufficient government start-up capital to encourage 
new initiatives, as NTEC examines start-up cases from the point of view of commerce and whether 
they will make a project. There is also a very low level of technological utilisation when investing in 
IT.  
 
Kuwait therefore needs to find a way to move forward and the new emiri vision makes very clever 
recommendations. Kuwait should create a task team to regulate and implement policies relating to 
education, IT and a technology plan.  
 
Dr Al-Ebraheem ended with three recommendations:  
a) Kuwait needs to develop an indicator to measure the level of integration of supply and 
demand.  
b) The country needs to advance the level of technology used in Kuwait.  
c) It should also develop a report to send to the Council of Higher Planning to develop a 
strategy with a clear vision and objectives and a roadmap. This must be very specific with a 
timescale, maybe allowing competition between sectors instead of allowing them all to 
move forward simultaneously.  
 
Dr Moudi Al-Homoud, Minister of Education, stated that there has been a drive for higher 
education, but that Kuwait has encountered many challenges to develop the educational system. 
There have been noble intentions but disappointing end results that have been less than expected. 
High spending and coverage have not been matched by international results. Students lack 
incentives to join good schools to pursue an education; consequently Kuwait needs to increase 
efficiency and competency among students.  
 
In higher education, Kuwait needs to improve the standard of universities (both public and private) 
and research output, including the insertion of Kuwaitis into world-class universities. This, in 
common with the other challenges outlined above, needs to be addressed and priorities set as they 
cannot all be tackled simultaneously. The Four Year Plan therefore sets the following priorities:  
a) Increasing competence in international exams, particularly maths and science, by 
improving curricula.  
b) Improving the quality of teachers and learning.  
c) Improving technology and education in general.  
 
These are the three major projects and priorities currently ongoing. Kuwait needs to integrate them 
with the national vision in terms of aligning with private sector and other institutions, as education is 
the cornerstone of the knowledge economy.  
 
Dr Rola Dashti, Member of the National Assembly, stated that the discussion over the 
knowledge economy is vital to facing the challenges confronting Kuwait. The country needs to 
know how to move forward from a notion of citizens’ entitlement to one of citizens’ engagement. 
This shift requires a great deal and the knowledge economy is a pillar of it.  
 
Dr Dashti added that human resource development is a big challenge. The quality of education and 
knowledge creation at the student base is inadequate for a knowledge society. This also has socio-
economic implications as the poor standard of many students’ education leads to marginalised and 
unemployable sectors.  
 
There is a lot of aspiration in Kuwait but a lack of a reform agenda for education, particularly now 
when there is a lot of collaboration between the parliament and the government. Kuwait must 
consequently change its education model from resources- to results-oriented and needs stronger 
links with industry. It needs accountability and the measurement of results through indicators. 
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Economic incentives are also important to the knowledge economy as Kuwait has a bad reputation 
for doing business, a poor tendering system and a lack of trust in the government.  
 
Reforms must encourage risk taking and the creation of SMEs. This means much more than the 
mere availability of credit, as tackling corruption, ensuring transparency, quality and the 
effectiveness of government all need to improve. This is vital to enhancing integrity and preparing 
laws covering conflicts of interest, asset allocation, corruption and FDI. A comprehensive package 
is thus needed that relates to integrity and openness. Moreover, intellectual property rights are low 
on the agenda while the innovation strategy is undeveloped. This needs to cover R&D, think-tanks, 
non-governmental organisations, consultancies and the creation of knowledge itself.  
 
Dr Dashti ended by arguing that Kuwait is undergoing a period of transformation, and “business as 
usual” will not suffice. This presents many opportunities to capitalise on as Kuwait moves into this 
transformation. These include a business-friendly playing field; public governance, transparency 
and the rule of law; intellectual property legislation; and cooperation between R&D and universities. 
Underlying all this is the need to think outside the box. The plan of transforming the whole of 
Kuwait society means that there is much transformation to be done. This entails more than 
developing the financial sector as it includes the middle class, economic relations, the productive 
base and capacity building.  
 
Dr Abdullah Al-Sharhan, Australian College of Kuwait, stated that an important law was Law 34 
of 2000 allowing the establishment of private universities. This was a regulatory law that introduced 
a healthy degree of competition and cooperation among universities. It created the Private 
Universities Council and has been very conducive and helpful in private education. It encouraged 
Kuwait to internationalise higher education using foreign university partners to enhance the transfer 
of technology and know-how. 
 
Dr Al-Sharhan described how the Higher Education Ministry utilised the offset programme, for 
example through the delivery of sophisticated equipment for teaching aviation maintenance and 
utilising this sophisticated equipment. He called for more support for research in private 
universities, including funding bodies to specifically support entrepreneurial activities and facilitate 
the commercialisation of technology. Kuwait also needs more youth clubs, such as the Science 
Club established in the 1970s, which tapped the hobbies of youth and directed them into scientific 
studies. 
 
Abdulmajeed Al-Shatti, Commercial Bank of Kuwait, focused on the relationship between the 
financial sector and the knowledge economy:  
a) The financial sector is a heavy user of IT and banks are major customers of consultancy 
firms.  
b) The financial sector has led investment in developing the knowledge economy through 
buying and customising technology, investing in firms either directly or indirectly, and R&D.  
c) The banks are regular contributors to KFAS and Kuwaiti universities and research 
institutes. This is part of their corporate social responsibility projects, but the levels of 
venture capital are low.  
d) Banks are a major source of information, both micro and macro. 
 
He identified several trends and future challenges:  
a) The financial industry is very competitive and it will always be a source of innovation.  
b) There is a trend in east Asia towards mobile phone companies investing in banks. 
 
However, there are major challenges to developing the knowledge economy in Kuwait: will 
financing come from the government or the private sector? Is the government ready to accept 
failures or lack of tangible results? Is it ready to increase investment in intangibles, particularly after 
the financial crisis? Where will the data repository reside and who will own it – the customers, the 
banks or others? The issue of data security is very important.  
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Dr Adel Asim, NOC, stated that the offset programme depends on the participation of foreign 
companies. In Kuwait, 35 per cent of the value of contracts fall under the offset programme, which 
started in 1992 under the Ministry of Finance. However, poor performance led to the government 
freezing it in 2004 while it determined its performance and capabilities. It consulted the World 
Bank, which recommended the creation of NOC in 2005, and this began operating in 2006. Dr 
Asim emphasised its results by stating that under the Ministry of Finance between 1992 and 2004 
there was a total of 25 offset programmes, worth KD 741 million. Already, since 2006, 20 projects 
have been completed, worth KD 1,314 million.  
 
The offset programme has three major objectives: to transfer modern technology to Kuwait; to 
enhance high-skill jobs for Kuwaiti nationals; and to enhance education. It intersects with several 
pillars of the knowledge economy:  
a) Through education and informatics, which are the main area of contribution, it intersects 
with the innovation area. 
b) It supports various economic areas within Kuwait, including training and opportunities, 
interaction between local entrepreneurs and foreign contractors, in order to facilitate joint 
business ventures in Kuwait.  
c) It has contributed to offset projects that could become pillars of the knowledge economy, as 
it has completed 19 education and training projects. It has also supported the private sector 
and created job opportunities.  
d) It has established a fellowship programme run by the Ministry of Higher Education allowing 
Kuwaitis to obtain scholarships in higher education in science, engineering and medicine. 
This programme has sent 250 students abroad since 2003. 
e) The KU Research Park is a current project with a mission to become a resource hub and 
education centre. Its focus is on science and the creation of a lasting partnership between 
the government, research institutes and the private sector. There is also a project in 
maritime management and aviation management (through Boeing at the Australian College 
of Kuwait). 
f) It has expanded training facilities and training programmes for Kuwaitis.  
 
There are, however, a number of difficulties facing the offset programme:  
a) It has not moved as smoothly as was hoped, facing many obstacles, including licensing, 
approval, government allocation of land and implementation.  
b) There are sometimes two- to three-year delays for government approval, which 
discourages foreign contractor participation.  
c) Foreign companies are reluctant to invest in equity and would rather just give money and 
be finished their offset obligations.  
 
Dr Adnan Al-Sultan argued that importance lies not so much in first-mover advantage as in 
sustainability, and this is lacking in Kuwait. The MIT–Harvard High-Value-Added Strategy was 
approved by the Council of Ministers in February 1990, but where is it now? The first study on 
Kuwait as a financial centre was completed in 1989, but how has the country moved on from this? 
Kuwait back then also looked to Hong Kong and Singapore as models of development. Therefore 
the problem is not first mover but how to continue.  
 
Dr Al-Sultan described how NTEC started as a concept in 1998 within KIA. NTEC materialised in 
2002, with a long delay between the idea and its execution. He then argued that an innovation 
ecosystem does exist through KISR, KFAS, KU and KPC, but this is scattered, and NTEC should 
capitalise on these existing institutions. NTEC has thus far focused on water and the environment, 
with 32 investments. It has been financially successful and achieved technology transfer. It has 
also created the Entrepreneurship Centre jointly with MIT, because Kuwait lacked a culture of 
entrepreneurship. It has a low cost with a budget of $50,000. It has supported a number of local 
projects, including two centres within KISR (one in partnership with Microsoft). Hence it has had 
some successful and positive outcomes.  
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However, Kuwait needs a clear vision to improve the culture of business and entrepreneurship, 
stakeholder accountability resting in the emiri office, enforcement to guarantee the implementation 
of reforms, and a requirement to spend money on necessary improvements.  
 
Dr Mohammad Al-Ramadhan, KPC, stated that intense R&D is ongoing at KPC. This has 
changed dramatically in recent years as previously a low emphasis had been placed on 
technology. There is now a new focus on investment in new technology and people, and a plan to 
create a petroleum centre. The challenge now is to ensure investment in technology to meet KPC 
objectives. It has worked with NTEC to identify good technologies for investment in by KPC. 
Nevertheless, Kuwait needs to move from making the initial investment to transferring the 
technology back to Kuwait. This requires absorptive capacity for new technologies. The question 
thus is whether Kuwait can take advantage of this investment.  
 
He explained that as oil is the main source of income in Kuwait it is important for KPC to continue 
to have oil as the primary source of energy. Consequently, KPC created a fund to focus on 
investment in start-up technologies in North America and Europe, and most investment has been 
in clean energy funds. Dr Al-Ramadhan ended by stating that KPC is going ahead with plans for an 
R&D centre in petroleum research and that is has identified an important niche for Kuwaiti 
opportunities in developing projects as part of the Clean Development Mechanism. Kuwait can also 
enter the Carbon Trading Scheme and invest in the development of renewable energy such as 
solar or wind.  
 
Dr Mahdy Al-Jazzaf, KU, summarised the findings of the Blue Ribbon report commissioned in 
December 2006. These included low investment in publicly funded R&D, absence of a national STI 
council, lack of R&D focusing systematically on the most significant priorities facing Kuwait, 
deficiencies in KU and KISR, isolation from global R&D networks, and a commercial and industrial 
sector not aligned with R&D requirements.  
 
The Blue Ribbon report consequently recommended the following actions:  
a) Significantly increase investment in R&D to 1 per cent of GDP in five years and 2 per cent 
in ten. It is currently less than 0.1 per cent so this would be a 10-fold increase. 
b) Emphasise petroleum research, renewable energy (especially solar) and water technology, 
and create centres of excellence in them.  
c) Create a National STI Council as Kuwait needs a higher body to set plans, develop a 
strategy and monitor implementation of projects.  
d) Reorganise around centres of excellence reflecting national priorities.  
e) KU should strengthen R&D and promote collaboration with other institutions at home and 
abroad, as well as linkages with industry.  
 
Dr Mansour Ghuloom ended the session by arguing for a clear vision for the future of education, 
which Kuwait currently lacks. This must cover the meaning and methodology of education. Dr 
Ghuloom added that Kuwait borrowed the idea of smart schools from Singapore and that he was 
instrumental in opening one, but that it ran out of funding and therefore had to close.  
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Appendix B: List of Interviewees 
 
The Work Foundation–LSE team wish to express their gratitude to the following interviewees for 
making available their time and expertise during the visit to Kuwait:  
 
Mohamed Abueljebain, National Offset Company  
Muhammad Al-Hashel, Central Bank of Kuwait 
Moudi Al-Homoud, Minister of Education 
Ali Al-Mudhaf, Public Authority of Industry 
Naja Al-Mutairi, Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research 
Yaquob Al-Refaie, Public Authority for Applied Education and Training 
Wael Al-Sagar, Businessman  
Tarik Al-Sultan, Agility 
Adel Al-Wogeyan, Higher Council for Planning 
John Baroudi, National Offset Company 
Kazem Behbehani, Dasman Centre for Research and Treatment of Diabetes 
Mona Bseiso, National Offset Company 
Ibrahim Dabdoub, National Bank of Kuwait 
Rola Dashti, Member of the National Assembly 
Lina Esbeitah, National Offset Company 
Mazen Madooh, National Offset Company 
Saad Okasha, Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development 
Aziz Sultan, Kuwait Engineering Office 
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Appendix C: Mr Will Hutton’s Presentation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Knowledge Economy: implications and 
challenges for Kuwait
Professor Will Hutton 
Presentation to KFAS Seminar 
15th March 2010
Why are we here? 
• The Knowledge Economy is 21 st century story 
• Need to understand in Kuwaiti terms 
• Potential tool to  operationalise 4 year plan and  
vision of HH the Emir 
• The Work Foundation perspective  
• Invitation from KFAS  
• Information gathering, hypothesis testing to support  
a draft interim report. 
• Further work may follow … .  
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Outline of Presentation 
• Definition of Knowledge Economy
• The evolution and prospects of Knowledge Economy
• The Innovation Eco-system
• Mapping the Kuwaiti context
• Strategies for an emerging small state economy
• Avenues for further exploration
Defining the Knowledge Economy
“ Economic success is increasingly based on the effective 
utilisation of intangible assets such as knowledge, skills, 
and innovative potential as the key resource of competitive 
advantage. The term  knowledge economy is used to 
describe this economic structure”
Source: UK Economic and Social Research Council 2005
Knowledge based industries defined by the OECD
Note: manufacturing classified by R&D intensity; services classified by ICT use and employment of graduates. Recreational and cultural industries recognised as knowledge 
based by EU but not OECD, and includes libraries and museums.
Market based Knowledge 
industries
Public based knowledge 
industries
Other market based 
industries
Other public based 
industries
• High to medium high 
tech based 
manufacturing
• High tech services 
(telecommunications, 
computer services, 
R&D services)
• Financial services
• Business services (real 
estate, advertising, 
accountancy, legal, 
technical, consultancy)
• Cultural and creative 
industries
• Education
• Health and social work
• Low to medium low 
tech based 
manufacturing
• Distribution, hospitality
• Transport
• Other services (dry-
cleaning, hairdressing, 
refuse collection
• Recreational and 
cultural services*
• Public administration
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Growth of knowledge based service industries in 
Europe and US 1970-2005
US share of value added
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
_
1
9
7
0
_
1
9
7
2
_
1
9
7
4
_
1
9
7
6
_
1
9
7
8
_
1
9
8
0
_
1
9
8
2
_
1
9
8
4
_
1
9
8
6
_
1
9
8
8
_
1
9
9
0
_
1
9
9
2
_
1
9
9
4
_
1
9
9
6
_
1
9
9
8
_
2
0
0
0
_
2
0
0
2
_
2
0
0
4
s
h
a
re
 o
f 
v
a
lu
e
 a
d
d
e
d
Total Manf
KE Services
Other Services
EU15 share of value added
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
_1
97
0
_1
97
2
_1
97
4
_1
97
6
_1
97
8
_1
98
0
_1
98
2
_1
98
4
_1
98
6
_1
98
8
_1
99
0
_1
99
2
_1
99
4
_1
99
6
_1
99
8
_2
00
0
_2
00
2
_2
00
4
p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 o
f 
v
a
lu
e
 a
d
d
e
d
Total Manf
KE Services
Other Services
Employment growth across the OECD 1990-2005
-19.2%
66.9%
39.8%
7.8%
28.5%
12.1%
-30%
-20%
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
HMT Manufacturing Business Services Public based Financial Services All KE All Other
Kuwait and the Knowledge Economy  
A report prepared for KFAS 
 
© The Work Foundation. 58 
 
 
Key drivers of the knowledge economy
Growing as proportion of GDP in all western & advanced Asian economies
Driver Two
Shift in demand towards higher 
value added, 
experiential services and tech 
based goods as consumers have 
become more sophisticated and 
diversified.
Driver One
New technologies, especially General 
Purpose Technologies ( GPTs), create 
new goods, services, 
processes 
and business models with multiple 
spill-overs.
Intangibles and tangible forms of investment
Brand equity (strategic advertising plus market 
research)
Firm specific human capital (employer 
provided training)
Organisational structure (share of 
management time spent on strategy plus cost 
of external consultants)
Economic 
competencies
Vehicles
Scientific and non-scientific R&D
Mineral exploration, copyright, licence costs*
New products from the finance industry
New architectural and engineering designs
Innovative propertyPlant and 
machinery
Software and databases*Computerised 
information
Buildings
IntangiblesTangibles
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The rise and rise of “intangibles” – proof positive of 
the emergent Knowledge Economy
Intangibles investment  share 1970-2004
Business investment in intangibles as a share of market sector value added adjusted to take account of 
intangibles. HMT October 2007
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What sort of intangibles does business invest in?
N
1.6% 2.0%
2.3%
1.3%
2.0%
1.1% 1.3% 0.9% 1.0% 1.1%
6.4% 5.3%
4.2%
4.7%
5.4%
4.9%
3.6% 4.6%
3.2%
3.5%
2.7%
1.7%
1.2%
1.5%
1.0%
0.8%
1.4% 0.5%
1.2% 0.6%
3.7%
4.5%
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Human and organisational capital
Brand equity
Innovation - R&D, copyright, design
Software
A short history of general purpose technologies 
(GPTs)…
• 9000 BC – 1400AD Seven GPTs
domestication of animals & plants; wheel; 
smelting of ore; writing; use of bronze; 
iron & steel; creation of water wheel
• 1400  – 1750 Two GPTs
three masted sailing ship and printing
• 1750 - 1900 Five GPTs
steam engine; factory system; railway; iron
steamship; communications
• 1900– 2000 Nine GPTs
internal combustion engine; electricity; 
motor vehicle; airplane; mass production; 
computer; lean production; internet; 
biotechnology
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Twenty-first century prospects? 
Grand challenges for engineering
• Nanotechnologies
• Energy from fusion
• Advanced materials
• Carbon sequestration
• Manage the nitrogen cycle
• Water
• Health informatics 
• Durable customised infrastructure
• Customised medicine
• The brain
• Cyberspace security
• Enhance virtual reality
• Personalised learning
Why exponential growth of innovation
• Knowledge is a public good that constantly 
expands with each individual contribution to the 
pool of common knowledge from which others draw
• Multiple combinations of ideas ceaselessly growing
• As a result much invention and innovation happens 
simultaneously
• Research scientists report that their research 
anticipated by other teams  
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A national innovation eco-system to support 
productive entrepreneurship
• Openness
• Public Research
• Entrepreneurship
• Competition
• Private and public demand
• Access to Finance
• Skills
An innovation eco-system (continued)
• A small economy innovation ecosystem must be more open
• Small economy innovation ecosystems necessary both for 
indigenous entrepreneurship and capacity to absorb FDI 
and foreign technologies. The superabundance of 
knowledge hard to manage in terms of focus and 
management.
• Productive entrepreneurship really hard to generate. 
Entrepreneurs chase profit wherever it can be found. They 
will seek rents, tax breaks and monopoly licenses.  Why 
good governance, openness, proper property rights so 
important. 
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Challenges for Kuwait
The big case for embracing the knowledge 
economy
• The twilight of petroleum - what happens when China     
slows?
• Fiscal risks as spending doubles in four years 
compounded by long run demographic change
• Environmental reckoning – resource insecurity
• Knowledge intensive industries have early mover 
advantage – very difficult to dislodge
• Mastery of one’s destiny
Political economy of unproductive 
entrepreneurship
• Kuwait a rentier state – widespread influence of rent-
seeking behaviour and policy on productive mentalities
• Patterns of state employment and lavish distribution of oil 
wealth have fostered culture of low productivity
• Insider/outsider markets (labour and product) 
• Kuwait developing reputation as ‘bad place to do business’
Kuwait and the Knowledge Economy  
A report prepared for KFAS 
 
© The Work Foundation. 64 
 
 
 
The political economy of Kuwait 
• Strong tradition of consultative govt and participatory politics
in Kuwait
• Benefits – system of checks and balances – little chance of 
replicating ‘Dubai model’ and over-reaching
• Some institutions work well (eg. independence and 
professionalism of Central Bank)
• But – repeated political crises since 2006 and slow progress 
with structural reforms and privatisation projects
• Good governance appears to have stalled in the past 
decade – key to ease of doing business. Others trending 
better on some key indicators 
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An audit of Kuwait’s innovation eco-
system: Assets
• Healthy oil revenues – can be used to develop capital-
intensive industries
• Energy prices to local industry necessarily lower  
• Favourable geographic position    
• Fewer transaction costs as a small state; in theory can 
mobilise resources, small number of players and monitor 
compliance with policy
• Embryonic elements in eco-system eg “transformed”KISR
Audit …
• Young population – youth bulge (50% of population under 
20) and % of working age Kuwaitis predicted to rise to 48.9 
% of population 
• Rich, sophisticated consumers – hungry adopters of new 
technology
• Investment in and commitment to education, even if returns 
are disappointing
• Political will at the very top 
• Low inequality and strong sense of citizenship
An audit of Kuwait’s innovation eco-system: weaknesses
• Entrepreneurship – 2 new businesses per 1000 inhabitants. 
The lack of intermediate organisations: trade associations 
and professional societies
• Accountability and governance structures of private 
companies (family businesses, co-operatives)?
• Research – 0.17 per cent of GDP. Universities focused on 
teaching.  
• How good is capacity to horizon scan and articulate new 
demand? 
• Public procurement? Can knowledge transfer be sustained 
through offsets?  Transparency of tenders? 
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Challenges continued…
• Finance – time horizons, hurdle rates, appetite for risk, appropriate for
firms over life cycle? 
• Skills – education scores between 50-60 per cent top performers and 
60-70 per cent of international median.
• Gender gap – girls outperform boys  by international criteria
• Technical skills  and 21st century skills indifferently embedded in the 
curriculum. But reform likely to be contested
• Is the teaching profession sufficiently respected and rewarded? A recent 
survey of GCC wages found that among the 16 industries surveyed,
education ranked 14th
• Can markets be developed with such small domestic market? 
Kuwait and the Knowledge Economy  
A report prepared for KFAS 
 
© The Work Foundation. 68 
 
 
• Imports of capital goods/purchase of foreign companies are 
particularly effective, as they entail greater control over the 
tacit elements of technology.
• Transfers through FDI are tricky.
• Movement of highly skilled personnel is another important 
channel. Knowledge workers tend to be attracted by less 
tangible factors.
• Proximity to large and growing markets and effective 
transport links can offset some of the disadvantages of 
being small. 
Small state knowledge transfer strategies 
• Natural-resource vertical integrators
• Local optimisers
• Low cost partner
• The global consolidator strategy
• Global first mover
Strategies for firms without real 
knowledge assets in emerging economies
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Finance – a viable area but not too far
Strategic Options
• Precondition for medium and long term success is education, notably of 
boys.  Must start early rather than view universities as finishing schools
• Reconcile excellence with equality 
• Rewards and incentives need to be aligned to discretionary effort
• Reformulate social contract eg the American Alaska Permanent Fund or 
European  flexi-security. Universal citizen grants conditional on graduation
• Identify partners that need you as much as you need them; think Boston 
University as much as Harvard and MIT. Opportunities as universities in 
the OECD face spending cuts and freezes
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Strategic Options continued
• Me too strategies – financial entrepot, tourism – are limited because 
give no first mover advantage. Instead the question should be: how do 
they serve knowledge economy?
• Firm strategies should be “natural resource vertical integrators” (Energy, 
solar and waste must be areas) or “local optimisers”. 
• Knowledge economies are about a wide range of intangibles – not just 
S&T and R&D; what about design, architecture, advertising etc? 
• “Manu-services” and Islamic finance
Strategic options continued..
• Focus should be GCC, Africa and India – less Asia, Iran and Iraq
• Innovation is uncertain: policy must involve the support of failed 
entrepreneurial projects, as a necessary part of fostering the successful
• In terms of eco-system the best short term source of IP is overseas; 
acquiring branding and marketing know-how is particularly important
• Soft infrastructure needs urgent attention – can professionalism of 
Central Bank be extended? A more competitive civil service? e-
government?
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